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Is	Global	Poverty	a	Crime	against	Humanity?		
In	his	work	on	global	poverty,	Thomas	Pogge	(2010,	1-2)	compares	the	discovery	that	all	the	adults	he	knew	growing	up	in	post-war	Germany	were	in	some	way	connected	to	the	crimes	of	Nazis,	with	the	children	of	today	discovering	that	all	the	 adults	 in	 affluent	 countries	 are	 similarly	 connected	 to	 an	 international	system	 that	 “kills	 more	 efficiently	 than	 the	 Nazi	 extermination	 camps”.	 He	 is	referring	to	his	argument	that	the	international	economic	system	is	responsible	for	the	immiseration	and	deaths	of	millions	of	people.	He	compares	the	decision-making	 processes	 of	 major	 international	 institutions	 with	 the	 Wannsee	Conference,	 which	 laid	 out	 the	 details	 of	 the	 Holocaust	 (Pogge	 2010,	 4).	 He	deems	 ordinary	 citizens	 of	 a	 developed	 state	 as	 culpable	 for	 global	 poverty	 as	ordinary	 Germans	 were	 for	 the	 Holocaust,	 insofar	 as	 they	 tacitly	 support	 and	benefit	 from	a	 system	 that	 facilitates	 the	deaths	of	millions	 (Pogge	2008,	31-2,	141-2,	 151;	 Pogge	 2010,	 29,	 73-9).	 His	 comparisons	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 Nazi	Germany,	but	also	 include	Stalin’s	USSR,	China	during	 the	Great	Leap	Forward,	and	 apartheid-era	 South	 Africa	 (Pogge	 2008,	 54,	 102;	 Pogge	 2010,	 51-2).	 The	comparison	 of	 global	 poverty	with	 genocide	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 is	 a	recurring	theme	in	Pogge’s	work,	but	it	has	not	been	seriously	explored.	
This	 oversight	 is	 understandable.	 It	 seems	 to	 be	 little	 more	 than	 a	rhetorical	flourish	to	underscore	his	criticism	of	the	international	system.	There	are	good	reasons	to	be	sceptical	of	hyperbolic	statements.	They	could	debase	the	moral	 currency	 of	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 by	 making	 it	 encompass	 any	lamentable	 circumstance.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 evaluate	 this	 claim	 by	testing	Pogge’s	thesis	on	the	causes	of	global	poverty	against	the	definition	of	a	
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crime	against	humanity	that	has	developed	in	international	law	since	the	end	of	the	 Second	 World	 War.	 It	 will	 be	 argued	 that	 there	 are	 sufficient	 parallels	between	 Pogge’s	 thesis	 on	 global	 poverty	 and	 the	 crimes	 of	 enslavement	 and	apartheid	to	take	the	claim	seriously,	but	with	some	reservations	about	the	mens	
rea	behind	the	“crime	of	poverty”.	
This	 is	 not	 a	 trivial	 conclusion.	 If	 global	 poverty	 is	 comparable	 with	 a	crime	against	humanity,	 it	 raises	 several	 issues	 that	may	be	uncomfortable	 for	cosmopolitans	 and	 their	 fellow	 travellers.	 The	 first	 is	 urgency.	 The	 long-term	reform	that	characterises	most	cosmopolitan	literature,	including	Pogge’s	work,	is	not	fit	for	purpose.	Crimes	against	humanity	require	immediate	action	due	to	their	severity.	The	debate	on	global	poverty	must	provide	guidance	about	what	can	 be	 done	 immediately.	 Consequently,	 a	 non-ideal	 theory	 needs	 to	 be	prioritised	by	cosmopolitans.	This	sort	of	guidance	cannot	be	the	anodyne	non-ideal	 fallback	 of	 donating	 a	 sum	 of	money	 to	 charity,	 knowing	 that	 it	 will	 not	affect	the	causes	of	global	poverty,	but	needs	to	match	the	urgency	of	the	wrong	being	committed.	Secondly,	 it	brings	 into	 focus	 the	global	poor	as	active	moral	agents	 and	 not	 just	 docile	 supplicants.	 If	 the	 global	 poor	 are	 victims	 to	 an	ongoing	 and	 intransigent	 crime	 against	 humanity,	 what	 are	 they	 morally	permitted	to	do	in	their	own	defence?	We	do	not	blame	the	Jews	of	the	Warsaw	Ghetto	for	resisting	the	Nazis	by	force	of	arms,	so	could	we	blame	the	global	poor	if	they	took	up	arms	against	those	responsible	for	the	international	system?	This	exposes	 the	 revolutionary	 core	 of	 cosmopolitanism	 that	 has	 been	 obscured	 by	the	polite	discourse	of	contemporary	liberalism.	
	 3	
That	 being	 said,	 this	 is	 only	 intended	 to	 open	 a	 conversation.	 The	conception	of	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	 employed	 is	 drawn	 from	 international	law	 rather	 than	 an	 independent	 conception	 of	 what	 makes	 a	 crime	 against	humanity	a	unique	 form	of	moral	wrong.	This	conception	acts	as	a	placeholder	due	to	the	lack	of	consensus	on	what	makes	crimes	against	humanity	especially	repugnant.	 This	 is	 tolerable,	 since	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 see	 whether	 Pogge’s	 claim	 is	more	than	rhetoric	and	the	current	understanding	in	international	law	provides	a	baseline	 for	assessment.	 If	global	poverty	meets	 this	baseline,	 then	 it	may	be	necessary	 to	 further	 examine	 the	nature	 of	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 to	 ensure	that	the	concept	is	not	over-expansive.		
The	paper	will	 begin	by	 examining	Pogge’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 international	system.	 This	 will	 then	 be	 compared	 with	 the	 elements	 of	 crimes	 against	humanity	 found	 in	 international	 law,	 especially	 in	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	International	 Criminal	 Court	 (Rome	 Statute).	 It	 will	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 claim	cannot	be	dismissed	based	on	the	elements,	but	that	it	is	insufficient	to	confirm	it.	 This	 requires	 the	 comparison	 with	 existing	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 since	Article	 7(1)(k)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 allows	 that	 acts	 that	 are	 comparable	 to	existing	 crimes	 against	humanity	be	 included	 in	 the	 category.	The	 final	 part	 of	the	 paper	 will	 compare	 global	 poverty	 with	 the	 crimes	 of	 enslavement	 and	apartheid.	It	will	argue	that	there	is	a	sufficient	similarity	to	take	Pogge’s	claims	seriously.	This	will	be	done	by	exposing	the	presence	of	extreme	domination	in	all	 three,	 which	 decimates	 the	 capacity	 of	 human	 beings	 to	 live	 minimally	autonomous	and	worthwhile	lives.	The	paper	will	conclude	with	a	comment	on	the	implications	for	cosmopolitan	theory.	
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1:	The	Pogge	Thesis	
Pogge’s	 comparison	 between	 global	 poverty	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 is	derived	 from	 his	 thesis	 that	 global	 poverty	 is	 a	 violation	 of	 human	 rights.	 In	order	to	test	the	validity	of	the	comparison,	it	is	necessary	to	accept	this	thesis	as	valid,	or	at	least	plausible.	It	is	impossible	to	assess	the	comparison	with	crimes	against	 humanity	 without	 understanding	 what	 exactly	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 the	examination.	 This	 will	 hopefully	 convince	 sceptics	 that	 this	 thesis	 cannot	 be	dismissed	 out	 of	 hand.	 This	 is	 admittedly	 a	 controversial	 starting	 point.	However,	this	article	is	not	a	recapitulation	or	defence	of	the	Pogge	thesis,	but	is	an	enquiry	into	its	implications	if	true.	
1.1:	The	Structural	Conception	of	Human	Rights	
The	 conception	 of	 human	 rights	 that	 serves	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 Pogge’s	argument	 appears	 to	 be	 unconventional.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 is,	 to	 use	 his	terminology,	 institutional	 rather	 than	 interactional.	 However,	 it	 will	 be	 shown	that	this	is	unproblematic,	especially	because	it	is	compatible	with	interactional	conceptions.	 The	 difference	 between	 the	 interactional	 and	 structural	understanding	 is	 the	 agent	 against	 which	 rights	 claims	 are	 directed.	 In	 the	former	case,	human	rights	are	held	by	all	individual	human	beings	and	directed	against	all	other	human	beings	regardless	of	shared	institutions.	The	latter	case	makes	 human	 rights	 claims	 that	 individuals	 have	 against	 coercively	 imposed	social	institutions	(Pogge	2008,	176).	These	are	second	order	principles	and	only	impose	 indirect	 duties	 on	 individual	 human	 beings.	 This	 includes	 the	 negative	duty	not	to	support	coercively	imposed	social	institutions	that	“foreseeably	and	
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avoidably”	 leave	 people	 without	 secure	 access	 to	 the	 content	 of	 their	 human	rights	(Pogge	2008,	176).	
This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 shared	 institutions	 human	rights	do	not	exist,	but	only	 that	 they	are	 latent.	Pogge	compares	 this	with	 the	duty	to	keep	one’s	promises;	it	is	a	general	obligation	that	is	only	triggered	when	entering	into	a	specific	social	relationship	(Pogge	2008,	176-7).	It	also	does	not	deny	the	validity	of	interactional	human	rights.	The	structural	conception	has	a	distinct	 function;	 it	 provides	 a	 framework	 to	 judge	 coercively	 imposed	 social	institutions	(Pogge	2010b,	198).		
This	conception	of	human	rights	has	three	important	features.	The	first	is	that	 it	 is	 broader	 than	 a	 legalistic	 understanding	 of	 rights.	 It	 requires	 secure	access	to	the	content	of	human	rights	and	this	does	not	entail	that	people	hold	a	statutory	right.	If	a	person	has	reasonably	secure	access	through	the	customary	practices	 of	 their	 society,	 then	 there	 cannot	 be	 a	 human	 rights	 deficit	 (Pogge	2008,	 53).	 The	 structural	 conception	 looks	 towards	 achieving	 reasonable	thresholds	 of	 security	 to	 the	 contents	 of	 human	 rights	 rather	 than	 legal	codification.	 The	 second	 feature	 is	 the	 importance	 of	 official	 disrespect.	 The	violation	 of	 human	 rights	 is	 a	 public	 moral	 wrong,	 which	 is	 partly	 why	 such	violations	are	so	egregious.	They	can	occur	under	the	colour	of	law.	This	not	only	deprives	people	of	the	content	of	their	rights,	but	also	undermines	the	validity	of	such	rights	(Pogge	2008,	65).	Official	disrespect	is	not	limited	to	the	conduct	of	states,	 but	 to	 persons	 informally	 employed	 by	 the	 state,	 such	 as	 militias,	 or	indeed	by	giving	tacit	consent	for	private	organisations	to	act	with	impunity	by	doing	nothing	(Pogge	2008,	66-7).	The	third	feature	 is	 that	the	obligations	that	
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attach	 to	 individuals	 are	 negative.	 This	 avoids	 the	 libertarian	 scepticism	 of	positive	rights.	Individuals	are	not	required	to	provide	a	particular	good,	such	as	basic	 medicines	 or	 food,	 but	 are	 required	 to	 withhold	 support	 for	 social	institutions	that	deny	secure	access	to	such	goods	(Pogge	2008,	178).		
As	 to	whether	 freedom	from	poverty	 is	a	human	right,	Pogge	offers	 two	lines	 of	 argument.	 The	 first	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 human	 flourishing	 as	 a	component	of	any	form	of	moral	cosmopolitanism.	If	we	value	individual	human	beings	as	 the	basic	unit	of	moral	 currency,	 then	we	must	 respect	 their	 right	 to	live	 their	 conception	 of	 a	 good	 human	 life.	 It	 is	 impossible	 for	 a	 reasonable	conception	of	 a	good	human	 life	 to	 coexist	with	extreme	poverty	 (Pogge	2008,	33,	 175).	 The	 second	 argument	 is	 that	 freedom	 from	 poverty	 is	 already	recognised	 in	 international	 human	 rights	 instruments.	 Article	 25(1)	 of	 the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	states:	
Everyone	has	the	right	to	a	standard	of	living	adequate	for	the	health	and	well-being	of	himself	and	of	his	 family,	 including	 food,	 clothing,	housing	and	medical	care	and	necessary	social	services,	and	the	right	to	security	in	the	event	of	unemployment,	sickness,	disability,	widowhood,	old	age	or	other	lack	of	livelihood	in	circumstances	beyond	his	control.	
Further,	Article	28	of	the	UDHR	also	states:	
Everyone	is	entitled	to	a	social	and	international	order	in	which	the	rights	and	freedoms	set	forth	in	this	Declaration	can	be	fully	realized.	
Consequently,	 Pogge	 claims	 that	 freedom	 from	poverty	 is	 a	 recognised	 human	right	 and,	 although	 it	 may	 be	 debateable	 whether	 it	 entails	 positive	 action,	 it	
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requires	that	we	withhold	support	for	coercively	imposed	social	institutions	that	deny	people	secure	access	to	their	basic	human	rights	(Pogge	2010a,	28-30).		
1.2:	Global	Poverty	as	a	Human	Rights	Violation	
The	way	in	which	Pogge	sets	up	his	structural	conception	of	human	rights	often	focuses	on	the	state	rather	than	the	international	system.	This	is	not	surprising	given	that	states	are	coercively	imposed	and	are	the	most	well-known	violators	of	human	rights.	The	international	system	is	more	complicated	both	in	terms	of	whether	 it	 is	 coercively	 enforced	 and	 whether	 it	 actually	 does	 violate	 human	rights.	 Pogge	 refers	 to	 it	 as	 being	 “imposed”	 on	 the	 world’s	 poorest	 people,	although	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 he	 means.	 However,	 there	 is	 an	 argument	 in	 his	response	 in	 that	 those	 who	 say	 the	 international	 system	 is	 legitimate	 do	 so	because	 the	 poor	 voluntarily	 sign	 up	 to	 it	 and	 “volenti	 non	 fit	 iniura”	 (Pogge	2010a,	 33-4).	 However,	 consent	 only	 matters	 when	 there	 is	 a	 reasonable	alternative.	 The	 global	 poor	have	no	 reasonable	 choice	 but	 to	 join	what	Pogge	calls	 “WTO	globalisation”.	They	require	access	 to	 the	markets	of	 the	developed	world	and	lack	a	reasonable	alternative	(Pogge	2010a,	41-2).	Consequently,	the	international	system	is	considered	coercive,	not	because	there	 is	no	alternative	for	poor	states	seeking	access	to	wealthy	markets	but,	more	simply,	because	the	global	poor	have	no	alternative	to	the	state-based	system.	
As	 a	 coercively	 imposed	 social	 institution,	 the	 international	 system	 is	 a	proper	subject	for	human	rights	claims	and	makes	it	the	target	of	Pogge’s	claim	that	 it	 “foreseeably	 and	 avoidably”	 causes	 global	 poverty,	 which	 constitutes	 a	human	 rights	 violation.	 There	 are	 two	ways	 in	which	 the	 international	 system	
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does	 this:	 through	 the	privileges	granted	 to	 states	under	 international	 law	and	the	way	in	which	powerful	states	set	the	rules	of	the	global	economy.		
Any	group	that	manages	to	secure	the	means	of	coercion	within	a	state’s	territory	tends	to	be	recognised	as	the	legitimate	government	regardless	of	how	it	came	to	power,	how	it	treats	 its	people,	or	even	whether	it	has	support	from	the	 people	 (Pogge	 2008,	 118).	 It	 also	 importantly	 gains	 the	 right	 to	 act	 in	 the	name	 of	 its	 people,	 which	 brings	with	 it	 four	 privileges	 that	 help	 to	 create	 or	exacerbate	global	poverty.	The	resource	privilege	grants	control	over	the	natural	resources	 in	 a	 territory	 and,	 with	 it,	 the	 legal	 power	 to	 transfer	 ownership.	Consequently,	a	military	dictatorship	that	came	to	power	in	a	coup	d’état	can	sell	legal	 ownership	 of	 rights	 to	 a	multinational	 corporation.	 Pogge	 compares	 this	with	a	group	of	armed	thugs	seizing	control	of	a	warehouse	from	its	guards	and,	instead	of	having	to	move	the	goods	through	a	fence,	they	gain	the	legal	right	to	dispose	 of	 these	 goods	 as	 they	 see	 fit	 (Pogge	 2008,	 118-9).	 The	 borrowing	privilege	grants	the	right	to	borrow	from	international	bodies	in	the	name	of	the	people.	 The	 arms	 privilege	 grants	 the	 right	 to	 import	weapons	 and	 the	 treaty	privilege	 enables	 the	 government	 to	 create	 international	 obligations	 (Pogge	2008,	118-9,	171-2,	2010a,	48-9).			
These	privileges	 facilitate	oppression	and	 instability	 in	weak	states.	The	funds	that	are	made	available	by	resource	and	borrowing	privilege	can	be	used	to	 secure	oppressive	 regimes.	They	 can	be	used	 to	 create	patronage	networks,	such	as	among	junior	officers	in	the	military,	which	in	conjunction	with	the	arms	privilege	 to	buy	military	ordinance	 that	 can	be	used	maintain	an	authoritarian	regime.	 Oppressive	 regimes,	 supported	 by	 domestic	 clients	 and	 international	
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institutions,	have	no	incentive	to	provide	secure	access	to	the	content	of	human	rights	(Pogge	2010a,	49-50,	2008,	120).		
These	 privileges	 also	 destabilise	 weak	 states,	 especially	 those	 richly-endowed	with	 natural	 resources.	 The	 resource	 privilege	 provides	 a	 strong	 incentive	 for	powerful	 agents,	 such	 as	 the	 military,	 to	 seize	 power.	 The	 reward	 of	 seizing	power	outweighs	the	risks.	The	example	given	is	of	Nigeria,	which	produces	2mn	barrels	 of	 oil	 per	 day.	 The	 military	 has	 ruled	 for	 approximately	 half	 of	 the	country’s	 post-independence	 history	 and	 corruption	 has	 been	 difficult	 to	address,	as	removing	the	military’s	“prerequisites”	could	provoke	a	coup	(Pogge	2008,	 119).	 The	 borrowing	 privilege	 also	 has	 a	 destabilising	 effect.	 An	authoritarian	 regime	 may	 borrow	 excessively	 with	 little	 public	 benefit	 and,	should	 it	be	deposed	by	a	popular	revolution,	 the	debts	do	not	disappear.	This	constrains	 the	 new	 government’s	 ability	 to	 create	 social	 conditions	 in	 which	citizens	have	secure	access	to	the	content	of	their	human	rights,	as	much	of	the	government’s	 funds	 will	 be	 used	 to	 service	 debt	 (Pogge	 2010a,	 49).	 The	privileges	conferred	 to	 states,	 irrespective	of	 their	 character	or	origins	of	 their	governments,	 help	 to	 create	 an	 international	 order	 in	 which	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	secure	human	rights.		
The	 second	 aspect	 of	 the	 international	 system	 that	 Pogge	 identifies	 as	causing	 global	 poverty	 is	 how	 the	 asymmetric	 distribution	 of	 power	 between	states	influences	the	rules	of	the	global	economy.	Powerful	states	can	shape	the	agenda	 to	 suit	 their	 interests.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 how	 such	 states	 maintain	protectionist	subsidies	and	tariffs,	while	insisting	that	weak	states	remove	such	obstacles.	 The	 USA,	 for	 example,	 provides	 $4	 billion	 in	 subsidies	 to	 its	 cotton	
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industry,	 which	 only	 produces	 a	 crop	 worth	 $3	 billion	 (Bales,	 Trodd,	 and	Williamson	 2009,	 57).	 This	 effectively	 protects	 US	 cotton	manufacturers	 from	being	outcompeted	by	 rivals	 in	 the	developing	world.	Pogge	also	 identifies	 the	Agreement	of	Trade-Related	Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	Property	Rights	 (TRIPS)	 as	an	 example	 of	 how	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 run	 counter	 to	 the	 basic	rights	 of	 the	 global	 poor.	 TRIPS	 includes	 provisions	 that	 extend	 the	 20-year	patent	 protection,	 effectively	 allowing	 “evergreen”	 patents	 (Pogge	 2008,	 225).	The	 consequence	 of	 this	 is	 that	 patent-holders	 gain	 a	 price	monopoly	 on	 their	intellectual	 property	 (IP).	 IP	 rights	 to	 products	 such	 as	 films	may	not	 produce	human	 rights	problems,	 but	when	 it	 comes	 to	medicines	 it	 is	 a	different	 story.	The	 patent	 regime	 in	 TRIPS	 greatly	 reduced	 access	 to	 basic	 medicines	 by	removing	 generic	 alternatives	 and	 granting	 monopolistic	 price	 control	 to	 the	patent	holder.	This	can	increase	the	price	of	pharmaceuticals	by	a	factor	of	10	to	30	 (Pogge	 2008,	 225-6).	 This,	 for	 Pogge,	 is	 a	 case	 of	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 global	economy	favouring	property	rights	of	the	affluent	over	the	right	to	life	of	people	living	in	poverty.	
Pogge	identifies	three	factors	that	explain	why	poor	countries	would	sign	up	to	a	regime	that	works	against	the	interests	of	their	citizens.	The	first	is	a	lack	of	knowledge.	Representatives	of	poor	countries	were	excluded	from	the	“green	room”	negotiations	that	set	the	terms	of	the	agreement;	instead,	they	were	faced	with	 a	 28,000-page	 document	 that	 they	 could	 not	 have	 had	 time	 to	 fully	understand	 and	 had	 to	 sign	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 markets.	 Second,	 most	 poor	countries	lacked	the	power	to	be	able	to	negotiate.	The	asymmetric	distribution	of	power	compels	poor	states	to	sign	up	to	rigorous	patent	regimes	in	order	to	
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gain	 limited	 access	 to	markets	 in	 the	developed	world.	The	 third	 factor	 is	 that	political	power	is	asymmetrically	distributed	within	many	developing	countries.	The	 terms	 that	 leaders	 sign	 up	 to,	 thanks	 to	 the	 treaty	 privilege,	 may	 be	unbeneficial	 or	 harmful	 to	 the	 majority	 of	 citizens,	 but	 the	 ruling	 class	 may	accrue	significant	benefits	by	signing	up.	This	gains	credence	when	one	sees	that	the	 signatories	 to	 the	 WTO	 agreement	 include	 Sani	 Abacha,	 Suharto,	 Robert	Mugabe,	and	Mobutu	Sese	Seko	(Pogge	2008,	233-4).	
The	 privileges	 granted	 to	 states,	 together	 with	 the	 asymmetric	distribution	 of	 power	 in	 setting	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 global	 economic	 cooperation,	constitute	 a	 violation	 of	 basic	 human	 rights	 because	 they	 foreseeably	 and	avoidably	create	or	exacerbate	poverty.	This	undermines	the	basic	autonomy	of	individual	human	beings	and	runs	counter	 to	 the	 rights	 found	 in	human	rights	documents	such	as	the	UDHR.		
1.3:	Objections	
The	 Pogge	 thesis	 has	 received	 criticism	 from	 those	 who	 think	 that	 the	international	 system,	while	 sub-optimal,	does	not	harm	the	global	poor	and,	 in	fact,	 has	 lifted	 many	 people	 out	 of	 extreme	 poverty.	 The	 World	 Bank,	 for	example,	 places	 the	 level	 of	 people	 living	 in	 extreme	 poverty	 at	 a	 little	 over	 a	billion	in	2011,	whereas	in	1990	it	was	in	striking	distance	of	two	billion	(World	Bank	 2015).	 Of	 these,	 some	 380	 million	 people	 were	 lifted	 out	 of	 extreme	poverty	 in	 China	 between	 1987	 and	 2005	 (Pogge	 2010a,	 100).	 This	 broad	reduction	in	extreme	poverty,	coupled	with	China	as	the	paradigm	case	of	having	benefited	 from	WTO	 globalisation,	 seems	 to	 undermine	 the	 notion	 that	 global	poverty	is	a	human	rights	violation,	let	alone	a	crime	against	humanity.		
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However,	the	case	against	is	not	as	straightforward	as	it	seems.	In	the	first	place,	 the	 indices	 by	which	 the	World	Bank	 counts	 those	 living	 in	 poverty	 are	somewhat	 problematic.	 The	 international	 poverty	 line	 (IPL)	 is	 set	 at	 $1.25	 for	extreme	poverty	 and	$2.50	 for	 severe	poverty.	 Pogge	 reasonably	 suggests	 that	this	is	an	arbitrarily	determined	line	that	does	not	capture	poverty.	For	example,	if	one	were	to	set	the	IPL	exclusively	at	$2.50,	then	there	would	be	no	reduction	in	 poverty	 between	 1990	 and	 2005	 (Pogge	 2010a,	 62-3).	 Moreover,	 when	comparing	the	current	IPL	with	previous	ones,	we	see	that	the	purchasing	power	of	 those	 counted	 has	 significantly	 declined.	 The	 1985	 IPL	 of	 $1.02	 had	 the	purchasing	 power	 of	 $1.85	 in	 2005	 (Pogge	 2010a,	 66-7).	 This	 indicates	 that	those	 just	 above	 today’s	 IPL	 have	 lost	 a	 third	 of	 their	 purchasing	 power	 from	their	equivalents	of	thirty	years	ago.	Adjusting	the	IPL	in	this	way	allows	a	rosier	picture	of	global	poverty	alleviation	to	be	painted.	Yet,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	that	a	person	living	just	above	the	IPL	has	secure	access	to	the	content	of	their	human	rights.						
China’s	economic	success	is	also	ambiguous;	it	is	undeniable	that	its	remarkable	growth	 has	 led	 to	 a	 large	 increase	 in	 GNI	 per	 capita.	 However,	 the	 actual	distribution	of	wealth	in	China	must	be	taken	into	consideration.	The	benefits	of	economic	 growth	 have	 been	 divided	 in	 a	 way	 that	 has	 fostered	 greater	inequality.	The	bottom	deciles	of	the	Chinese	population	have	seen	their	relative	share	of	 their	country’s	wealth	drop	 from	30.8%	in	1990	to	16%	in	2004.	This	has	 contributed	 to	 the	 further	 marginalisation	 of	 China’s	 poor	 in	 domestic	politics,	especially	considering	that	the	richest	decile’s	wealth	has	increased	from	25%	to	35%	in	the	same	period	(Pogge	2010a,	100-2).	The	growth	in	inequality	
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means	 that	 the	 poorest	 people	 in	 China	 have	 been	marginalised	 and	 have	 less	secure	access	to	the	content	of	their	human	rights.			
Additionally,	it	is	impossible	to	decouple	China’s	success	from	the	overall	global	economy.	Chinese	economic	growth	is	export-oriented.	 It	 is	premised	on	gaining	 access	 to	 markets	 in	 the	 developed	 world.	 This	 places	 China	 in	competition	 with	 other	 developing	 states.	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 lower	 export	prices,	 wages,	 and	 labour	 standards	 in	 all	 export-oriented	 developing	 states	(Pogge	2010a,	103).	Additionally,	 the	dramatic	 increase	 in	China’s	 imports	has	helped	to	increase	the	price	of	basic	resources	such	as	petroleum	and	food.	The	interdependence	 of	 the	 global	 market	 cannot	 be	 set	 aside,	 and	 China’s	 gains	might	explain	why	poverty	is	stagnant	or	increasing	in	other	parts	of	the	world	(Pogge	 2010a,	 103-4).	 The	 China	 example	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	 “some-all”	fallacy	 in	 that,	 since	 it	 has	 experienced	 rapid	 development,	 all	 developing	countries	 should	 be	 able	 to	 as	 well.	 If	 they	 do	 not,	 then	 it	 is	 because	 of	endogenous	 factors	 (Pogge	 2010a,	 43).	However,	 China’s	 growth	 occurs	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 international	 system,	 where	 its	 success	 has	 international	consequences	that	might	contribute	to	the	impoverishment	of	its	competitors.		
This	attacks	the	heart	of	nationalist	explanations	for	the	causes	of	global	poverty	–	or,	as	Pogge	calls,	 it	the	“purely	domestic	poverty	thesis”.	This	claims	that	local	factors	are	chiefly	responsible	for	the	wealth	or	poverty	of	a	state.	It	is	factors	such	as	corruption,	democratic	 citizenship,	work	ethic	and	 the	 like	 that	ultimately	 determine	 a	 state’s	 prosperity	 (Pogge	 2010a,	 32-4,	 2010b,	 220).	However,	what	the	argument	shows	is	that	local	culture	cannot	be	isolated	from	the	 international	 system.	 The	 privileges	 help	 to	 support	 corrupt	 governments	
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and	make	it	incredibly	difficult	for	newly	democratised	states	to	root	it	out.	The	asymmetry	in	bargaining	power	leads	to	global	trade	agreements	that	favour	the	interests	 of	 developed	 states	 in	 a	way	 that	 undermines	 secure	 access	 to	 basic	goods,	 such	 as	medicine.	However,	 that	 being	 said,	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 Pogge’s	thesis	that	suggests	a	“purely	global	poverty	thesis”.	Local	factors	such	as	culture	or	 resource	 scarcity	 may	 indeed	 produce	 poverty.	 Indeed,	 even	 if	 the	international	 system	was	 reformed	 so	 that	 citizens	 of	 the	 developed	world	 do	not	 violate	 their	 negative	 duty	 to	 refrain	 from	 supporting	 unjust	 social	institutions,	 significant	 pockets	 of	 poverty	 may	 continue	 to	 exist	 in	 the	developing	world	just	as	they	do	in	the	developed	world	today.	However,	this	is	not	a	problem	for	the	Pogge	thesis,	which	asserts	that	certain	characteristics	of	the	 international	 system	 foreseeably	 and	 avoidably	 produce	 poverty	 in	 a	 way	that	is	a	human	rights	violation.	It	does	not	put	forward	a	“purely	international	poverty	thesis”	(Pogge	2010b,	208-9,	246	fn.62).	
1.4:	Guidance	
The	 term	 “foreseeably	 and	 avoidably”	 recurs	 frequently	 in	 Pogge’s	works.	 It	 is	important	 because	 it	 means	 that	 poverty	 is	 not	 just	 an	 unintended	 or	unavoidable	 consequence	 of	 the	 international	 system,	 but	 something	 that	 is	predictable	and	unnecessary.	This	 is	meant	 to	diffuse	what	might	be	called	 the	“Churchillian	 objection”	 to	 the	 Pogge	 thesis:	 the	 international	 system	 may	 be	sub-optimal,	 it	may	 even	 produce	 global	 poverty,	 but	 it	 is	 the	 best	 system	we	have.	To	paraphrase	Churchill’s	pithy	defence	of	democracy,	WTO	globalisation	is	the	worst	form	of	international	economic	organisation,	except	for	all	the	other	ones	we	have	tried.	The	Churchillian	critic	may	agree	that	poverty	is	foreseeable	
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but	 disputes	whether	 it	 is	 avoidable.	 So,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 indicate	why	 Pogge	thinks	this	is	not	the	case	by	looking	at	his	alternatives.		
The	 guidance	 provided	 by	 Pogge	 is	 ambitious.	 It	 ranges	 from	 fairer	 terms	 of	economic	 cooperation	 within	 the	 existing	 framework	 to	 fundamental	adjustments	 to	 the	 international	 system.	 The	 loosening	 or	 elimination	 of	protectionist	barriers	to	the	developed	market	could	generate	upwards	of	$700	billion	in	earnings	for	developing	states	from	low	technology	and	resource-based	industries,	 according	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	 Conference	 on	 Trade	 and	Development	 (UNCTAD).	 This	 estimation,	 it	 should	 be	 noted,	 does	 not	 include	agricultural	 products	 (Pogge	 2010b,	 184).	 Lower	 projections,	 such	 as	 Cline’s	$86.51	billion,	 could	provide	poverty	 relief	 to	an	estimated	500	million	people	(Pogge	2010b,	185).	Additionally,	Pogge	also	endorses	reforms	to	prevent	profit	shifting,	 such	 as	 moving	 profits	 to	 low	 tax	 jurisdictions	 and	 expenses	 to	jurisdictions	 with	 high	 tax	 relief,	 cracking	 down	 on	 tax	 havens,	 and	 the	mitigation	of	 debt	 in	 the	developing	world	 (Brock	 and	Pogge	2014,	 4-6,	 Pogge	and	 Sengupta	 2014,	 8-9).	 These	 reforms	 would	 provide	 significant	 funds	 for	poverty	relief.		
Given	the	prominence	of	 the	privileges	 in	Pogge’s	analysis,	 it	 should	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	he	seeks	their	elimination	or	mitigation.	One	suggestion	is	that	new	democracies	might	“preauthorise”	intervention	by	the	United	Nations	or	regional	organisation	in	the	event	of	a	coup.	This	would	act	as	a	deterrent	by	increasing	the	risks	associated	with	seizing	power	to	gain	access	to	a	country’s	natural	 and	 financial	 resources	 (Pogge	 2008,	 159).	 However,	 there	 are	 less	hazardous	ways	 to	 reduce	 the	damage	done	by	 the	privileges,	 such	 as	 limiting	
	 16	
the	borrowing	privilege	of	 authoritarian	governments	 in	 a	way	 that	would	not	leave	a	newly	democratic	state	liable	for	debts	incurred.	The	example	given	is	a	constitutional	 amendment	 that	 prohibits	 international	 agents	 from	 lending	 to	unconstitutional	 governments	 (Pogge	 2008,	 160-1).	 Pogge	 also	 suggests	 a	“Democracy	 Panel”	 to	 monitor	 the	 democratic	 credentials	 of	 would-be	borrowers	and	a	“democracy	fund”	to	help	service	the	debts	of	new	democratic	states	 as	 they	 stabilise	 (Pogge	 2008,	 162-8).	 The	 resource	 privilege	 could	 be	undermined	by	similar	means	to	limit	how	governments	that	come	to	power	via	coup	attempts,	or	other	unconstitutional	means,	can	sell	resources;	such	means	could	 include	 a	 constitutional	 amendment	 banning	 unconstitutional	governments	from	selling	resources	and	such	governments	being	monitored	by	the	Democracy	Panel	(Pogge	2008,	168-72).	These	recommendations	may	seem	far-fetched,	but	they	are	not	impossible.	They	rest	on	constitutional	amendments	in	 developing	 states	 and	 a	 relatively	 small	 international	 body	 performing	 a	monitoring	role.		
The	 final	 two	 projects,	 the	 Global	 Resource	 Dividend	 (GRD)	 and	 the	Health	 Impact	 Fund	 (HIF),	 are	more	 radical.	 The	GRD	 is	 a	 plan	 to	 redistribute	wealth	 through	 a	 tax	 on	 the	 exploitation	 of	 natural	 resources.	 The	GRD	would	constitute	 a	 0.67%	 tax	 on	 the	 global	 product.	 In	 2005,	 this	would	 have	 raised	$300	billion	for	poverty	relief,	which	would	enable	some	2.5	billion	people	to	be	lifted	out	of	poverty	(Pogge	2008,	211).	How	these	funds	would	be	distributed	is	a	 matter	 of	 debate,	 but	 could	 range	 from	 an	 international	 body	 to	 giving	 the	funds	 directly	 to	 the	 global	 poor	 (Pogge	 2008,	 212).	 The	 GRD	 is	 not	 an	impossible	 goal.	 Its	 costs	 are	 comparable	 to	 half	 of	 the	 USA’s	 annual	 defence	
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budget	(Pogge	2008,	211).	However,	some	may	question	whether	it	is	a	realistic	goal.	 This	misses	 the	 point.	 Even	 if	 the	GRD	 is	 not	 realistic	 due	 to	 the	world’s	affluent	 being	 unwilling,	 as	 opposed	 to	 being	 unable,	 it	 acts	 as	 a	 means	 to	criticise	 the	 current	 international	 system.	 However,	 Pogge	 holds	 out	 hope	because	moral	convictions	have	proved	to	be	politically	potent,	as	was	the	case	with	the	abolition	movement	in	the	19th	century.	Moreover,	there	are	prudential	reasons	for	affluent	states	to	sign	on,	such	as	reducing	global	instability,	refugee	claims,	and	economic	migration	(Pogge	2008,	218-9).		
The	 HIF	 is	 an	 alternative	 scheme	 to	 the	 current	 TRIPS	 regime	 for	pharmaceutical	 research	 and	 dissemination.	 The	 HIF	 would	 amount	 to	 2%	 of	funds	 raised	 from	 the	GRD,	approximately	$6	billion	per	annum	 (Pogge	2010b,	185).	Pharmaceutical	innovators	would	have	the	option	of	signing	up	to	the	HIF	when	they	produce	a	new	drug	or	vaccine.	This	would	require	them	to	sell	their	product	 at	 cost	 for	 ten	 years.	 Profit	 is	 generated	 based	 on	 how	 the	 product	improves	 the	quality	of	global	health	 instead	of	monopoly	prices.	Pogge	claims	that	 this	 would	 offer	 significant	 advantages	 over	 the	 current	 regime.	 It	 would	improve	access	by	 lowering	 the	 cost	of	medicines	 (Pogge	2011,	540).	 It	would	encourage	research	into	vital,	but	low-use,	drugs,	such	as	last	line	antibiotics	to	treat	drug-resistant	tuberculosis,	since	the	profit	would	be	determined	by	impact	rather	 than	 units	 sold	 before	 patent	 expiry.	 It	 would	 also	 shift	 research	 away	from	 maintenance	 treatments,	 which	 the	 current	 system	 favours	 due	 to	 the	profitability	of	their	long-term	use,	to	prophylactic	treatments	such	as	vaccines,	which	would	have	profound	impacts	on	global	health	(Pogge	2011,	541-2).			
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Interventions	like	the	HIF	are	not	unheard	of	in	global	health,	as	the	HIF	bears	 similarities	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Global	 Alliance	 for	 Vaccines	 and	Immunization	 to	 encourage	 research	 into	 poverty-related	 diseases.	 The	 Gates	Foundation	donated	$750	million	and	helped	raise	$5	billion	to	establish	a	pool	of	capital	for	the	research	of	diseases	that	afflict	the	world’s	poor.	These	diseases	have	not	received	much	attention	from	the	pharmaceutical	industry	because	the	global	poor	are	not	reliable	consumers;	 they	may	generate	 intense	demand	 for	treatments,	 but	 they	 cannot	 pay	 for	 them.	 The	 fund	 created	 by	 the	 Gates	Foundation	altered	 the	 logic	of	 the	market	by	 creating	 a	 reliable	 consumer	 for	such	 goods.	 The	 result	 of	 this,	 it	 is	 hoped,	 will	 drive	 down	 drug	 prices	 and	encourage	 innovation	 in	 treatment	 (Cohen	and	Küpçü	2005,	46).	However,	 the	HIF	would	be	a	more	comprehensive	alternative	to	the	current	global	health	and	patent	regime.		
1.5:	Conclusion	
The	 Pogge	 thesis	 claims	 that	 the	 current	 international	 system	 foreseeably	 and	avoidably	violates	the	human	rights	of	hundreds	of	millions	of	people	by	creating	or	exacerbating	global	poverty.	These	violations	can	be	traced	to	 the	privileges	granted	 to	 states	 in	 international	 law	 and	 the	 use	 of	 asymmetric	 power	 to	 set	unfair	 terms	 of	 economic	 cooperation.	 These	 are	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	because	 they	 constitute	 “official	 disrespect”	within	 a	 coercively	 imposed	 social	institution.	They	are	not	the	inevitable	product	of	the	best	possible	international	system,	but	the	product	of	the	unwillingness	to	initiate	reform.		This	constitutes	a	 second-order	human	 rights	 problem	 for	 the	 affluent	 since	 they	 are	 complicit	
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with	 this	 system,	 but	 what	 remains	 to	 be	 determined	 is	 whether	 this	 is	complicity	with	a	crime	against	humanity.	
2.	Elements	of	Crimes	against	Humanity	
Crimes	against	humanity	remain,	as	Hannah	Arendt	wrote,	in	a	“tantalising	state	of	ambiguity”	(Arendt	2006,	257).	This	section	will	examine	the	elements	found	in	international	law.	It	will	focus	on	Article	7	of	the	Rome	Statute,	but	will	draw	on	 the	 judgments	 from	 the	ad	hoc	 tribunals	 and	 scholarship	on	 crimes	 against	humanity	where	necessary.	In	order	for	an	act	to	be	considered	a	crime	against	humanity,	Article	7(1)	of	the	Rome	Statute	states	that	it	must	be	“committed	as	part	of	a	widespread	or	systemic	attack	directed	against	any	civilian	population,	with	 knowledge	 of	 the	 attack.”	 This	 can	 be	 broken	 down	 into	 five	 necessary	conditions:	
i. There	is	an	attack.	ii. The	relevant	acts	are	part	of	the	attack.	iii. The	attack	must	be	widespread	or	systemic.	iv. The	attack	must	be	directed	against	a	civilian	population.	v. There	must	be	knowledge	of	the	attack.	
The	 elements	 provide	 a	 general	 framework	 for	 crimes	 against	 humanity.	 If	Pogge’s	argument	 is	 incompatible	with	any	of	 these	elements,	 then	we	can	say	that	his	comparison	is	invalid.		
2.1:	Attacks,	Acts,	and	Agents	
The	first	two	elements	of	a	crime	against	humanity	define	the	same	as	an	act	that	occurs	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 attack.	 The	 idea	 that	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	 is	
	 20	
necessarily	part	of	an	attack	seems	to	preclude	global	poverty	from	the	start.	The	term	 “attack”	 evokes	 the	 idea	 of	 violence	 and	 armed	 conflict.	 Although	 the	history	of	 crimes	 against	 humanity	does	 gesture	 towards	 this,	 the	 evolution	of	the	jurisprudence	since	the	Nuremberg	Trials	has	moved	away	from	a	necessary	link	between	attacks	and	war	or	even	violence.	
The	 initial	 formulation	of	 crimes	against	humanity	came	about	 from	the	agreement	 between	 the	 Allies	 to	 try	 members	 of	 the	 Axis	 powers	 during	 the	Second	World	War.	This	created	the	so-called	“war	nexus”	in	Article	6(c)	of	The	Charter	 of	 the	 International	 Military	 Tribunal,	 which	 linked	 crimes	 against	humanity	 to	 the	 laws	 of	 war.	 However,	 this	 did	 not	 last	 very	 long.	 The	 Allies	sought	 to	 bring	 charges	 for	 acts	 committed	 prior	 to	 the	 war,	 such	 as	 the	persecution	of	 the	 Jews	 in	Nazi	Germany.	Control	Council	Law	No.	10	(CCL	10)	recognised	 that	 “the	 grim	 fact	 of	worldwide	 interdependence”	meant	 that	war	crimes	were	not	 the	only	offences	 recognised	by	 international	 law;	 there	were	also	certain	offences	committed	by	the	German	state	against	its	own	citizens	that	violated	“common	 international	 law”	(Taylor	1949,	226).	 	CCL	10	extended	the	scope	 of	 the	 Nuremberg	 Trials,	 since	 “common	 international	 law”	 cannot	 be	limited	to	a	specific	context	such	as	the	Second	World	War	(Arendt	2006,	257-8,	Bassiouni	 2011a,	 144).	 This	 means	 that,	 even	 in	 peacetime,	 crimes	 can	 be	committed	by	the	state	or	another	agent	that	necessitate	international	action.	
The	decoupling	of	crimes	against	humanity	from	war	continued	with	the	drafting	 of	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Prevention	 and	 Punishment	 of	 the	 Crime	 of	Genocide,	where	 Article	 1	 explicitly	 states	 that	 genocide	 can	 occur	 in	 times	 of	peace	and	war.	It	is	true	that	genocide	and	crimes	against	humanity	are	distinct	
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in	international	law,	but,	as	Norman	Geras	(2011,	p.22)	points	out,	it	 is	difficult	to	identify	any	argument	that	would	decouple	genocide	from	war,	but	not	crimes	against	 humanity	 like	 mass	 murder	 or	 enslavement.	 This	 was	 the	 prevailing	opinion	when	 the	Rome	 Statute	was	 being	 drafted.	 If	 crimes	 against	 humanity	where	 linked	 to	 war,	 the	 Statute	 would	 have	 ignored	 these	 post-Nuremberg	developments	 and,	 additionally,	made	 it	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	 them	 from	war	crimes	(Robinson	1999,	45-6).	
War	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 characteristic	 of	 an	 attack,	 but	 there	may	 be	 an	“armed	 conflict	 nexus”.	 Article	 5	 of	 the	 Statute	 of	 the	 International	 Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former	Yugoslavia	(ICTY)	identifies	a	direct	link	between	crimes	against	 humanity	 and	 armed	 conflict.	However,	 no	 comparable	 link	 is	made	 in	Article	3	of	the	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	(ICTR)	or	 Article	 7	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute.	 Indeed,	 the	 decision	 in	 Akayesu	 specifically	stated	 that	 “an	 attack	may	be	 non-violent	 in	 nature,	 like	 imposing	 a	 system	of	apartheid…	or	exerting	pressure	on	a	population	 to	act	 in	a	particular	manner,	may	come	under	the	purview	of	an	attack,	if	orchestrated	on	a	massive	scale	or	in	 a	 systemic	 manner.”1	 This	 leaves	 the	 definition	 of	 an	 attack	 in	 a	 state	 of	ambiguity.	Indeed,	when	the	Rome	Statute	was	being	drafted,	some	delegations	wanted	 to	 replace	 “attack”	 with	 “widespread	 or	 systemic	 commission	 of	 such	acts”	 (Robinson	1999,	 47	 fn.22).	 Yet,	 the	 term	 “attack”	was	 included	 in	Article	7(2)(a)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 and	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 “a	 course	 of	 conduct	involving	the	multiple	commission	of	acts	referred	to	in	paragraph	1.”	
																																																								1	Judgement,	Akayesu	(ICTR-96-4-T),	Chamber	I,	2	September	1998,	¶581	(Hereinafter	Akayesu)	
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Whether	 the	 acts	 that	 comprise	 an	 attack	 are	 necessarily	 violent	 is	 a	matter	of	debate.	David	Luban	has	specifically	argued	that	admitting	non-violent	acts	would	undermine	crimes	against	humanity	by	making	the	definition	overly	capacious.	The	idea	of	an	attack	requires	something	more	than	a	stable	system	of	oppression	or	domination.	Luban	compares	it	with	a	military	campaign	that	has	the	 aim	 of	 annihilating	 or	 driving	 away	 the	 persecuted	 group	 instead	 of	exploiting	or	oppressing	it	(Luban	2004,	101-2).	If	Akayesu	is	followed,	it	would	allow	frivolous	cases	to	be	introduced,	such	as	forcing	immigrants	to	assimilate	by	 only	 having	 traffic	 signs,	 and	 government	 documents	 being	 produced	 in	 a	single	language.	Regardless	of	how	one	feels	about	this,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	a	crime	against	humanity	(Luban	2004,	103	fn.	68).	This	is	an	argument	that	one	should	 feel	 sympathetic	 towards.	 Crimes	 against	 humanity	 are	 supposed	 to	denote	 a	 particularly	 egregious	 form	 of	 wrong.	 However,	 this	 conservative	interpretation	 of	 an	 attack	 has	 serious	 problems.	 Enslavement,	 for	 example,	 is	considered	a	crime	against	humanity	and	certainly	slavery	has	been	marked	by	violence	within	the	relationship.	However,	violence	and	coercion	are	only	latent	in	 the	master-slave	 relationship.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 conceptualise	 a	 slave-owning	society	where,	due	to	a	strong	social	norm	against	mistreating	those	whom	one	owns,	 slaves	 enjoy	 a	 life	 that	 is	 indistinguishable	 from	 that	 of	 a	 free	 labourer	save	for	their	legal	bondage	(Lovett	and	Pettit	2009,	16).	Yet,	this	society	would	be	 violating	 Article	 7(2)(c)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute’s	 definition	 of	 slavery	 as	 “the	exercise	of	 any	or	 all	 of	 the	powers	 attaching	 to	 the	 right	of	 ownership	over	 a	person”.	The	wrongness	of	slavery	does	not	only	come	from	acts	of	violence	that	occur	within	it.	If	that	were	the	case,	then	it	would	be	redundant;	the	criminality	of	 slavery	would	 be	 covered	 in	 acts	 such	 as	murder,	 imprisonment,	 and	 rape.	
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Enslavement	 is	 listed	 because	 it	 creates	 the	 conditions	 of	 oppression	 and	exploitation	that	Luban	dismisses.	This	is	true	even	in	hypothetical	instances	of	benevolent	slavery,	as	 the	slave-owner	will	always	have	 the	reserved	power	 to	treat	their	property	as	a	thing	rather	than	a	person.	Fredrick	Douglass’	account	of	being	a	slave	shows	why	we	should	avoid	the	inclusion	of	direct	violence	as	a	necessary	component	of	an	attack:	
But	ask	a	slave	what	 is	his	condition	–	what	his	state	of	mind	–	what	he	thinks	 of	 enslavement?	 And	 you	 had	well	 address	 your	 inquiries	 to	 the	
silent	dead.	There	comes	no	voice	from	the	enslaved.	We	are	left	to	gather	his	feelings	by	imagining	what	ours	would	be,	were	our	souls	in	his	soul’s	stead.	If	 there	were	 no	 other	 fact	 descriptive	 of	 slavery,	 than	 that	 the	 slave	 is	dumb,	this	alone	would	be	sufficient	to	mark	the	slave	system	as	a	grand	aggregation	of	human	horrors	(Douglass	2003,	258).			Enslavement	 shreds	 autonomy,	 because	 even	 the	most	well-kept	 slave	 lives	 at	his	 or	her	owner’s	mercy.	To	use	Luban’s	military	metaphor,	 some	attacks	 are	like	 military	 occupations	 rather	 than	 campaigns.	 They	 are	 organised	 and	purposeful,	but	not	necessarily	violent.	What	distinguishes	them	from	the	traffic	sign	example	 is	 that	 they	 create	profound	human	 rights	deficits.	The	well-kept	slave	may	 enjoy	 a	 decent	 standard	 of	 living,	 but	 they	 does	 so	 at	 their	 owner’s	discretion.	They	do	not	have	secure	access	to	the	contents	of	their	human	rights.	As	 global	 poverty	 produces	 a	 human	 rights	 deficit	 that	 costs	 the	 lives	 of	 18	million	people	a	year,	there	does	not	seem	to	be	a	clear	reason	to	exclude	it	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	non-violent	(Pogge	2010a,	50).		
It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	definition	of	an	attack	identifies	the	type	of	agents	that	are	capable	of	committing	crimes	against	humanity.	Article	7(2)(a)	of	the	Rome	Statute	identifies	an	attack	as	being	“pursuant	to	or	in	furtherance	of	
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a	 state	 or	 organizational	 policy	 to	 commit	 such	 attack.”	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	quite	 clear;	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia	 and	Rwanda	 showed	 that	sub-state	 actors,	 such	 as	 paramilitary	 militias,	 can	 perpetrate	 mass	 atrocities	while	 being	 at	 arm’s	 length	 from	 the	 state	 (Bassiouni	 2003,	 187-8).	 What	 is	important	is	not	whether	an	organisation	has	formal	sovereignty,	but	whether	it	has	 the	 capacity	 to	 plan	 and	 execute	 an	 attack	 on	 a	 civilian	 population	(Robertson	 2012,	 514-5).	 This	 has	 been	 used	 to	 prosecute	 non-state	 actors.	Indeed,	the	first	indictees	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	were	the	leaders	of	the	 Lord’s	 Resistance	 Army,	 a	 terroristic	 guerrilla	 movement	 operating	 in	Uganda	and	South	Sudan.	It	would	be	absurd	to	assert	that	a	large	international	organisation,	 such	 as	 the	WTO,	 lacks	 the	 organisational	 capacity	 of	 a	 terrorist	group.	The	former	has	complex	bureaucracies	that	shape	global	economic	policy	in	a	way	that	affects	the	lives	of	billions	of	human	beings.	If	sub-state	actors	are	capable	 of	 committing	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 then	 ceteris	 paribus	international	actors	must	be	as	well.		
Consequently,	 the	 first	 two	 necessary	 conditions	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 a	crime	against	humanity	do	not	exclude	the	causes	of	global	poverty,	as	they	are	the	 product	 of	 an	 organisational	 plan	 that	 requires	 the	 commissioning	 of	multiple	 acts.	 However,	 what	 remains	 undetermined	 is	 whether	 the	 acts	 are	comparable	to	those	identified	as	crimes	against	humanity.	
2.2:	Widespread	or	Systemic	
The	third	condition	is	that	a	crime	against	humanity	be	widespread	or	systemic.	A	 crime	against	humanity	 is	not	 an	 isolated	 instance	of	murder	or	 rape.	These	acts	are	horrendous,	but	 they	must	occur	within	the	context	of	a	 larger	plan	 in	
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order	 for	 them	 to	 be	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity.	 This	 removes,	 or	 at	 least	minimises,	 random	 and	 uncontrolled	 conflict	 from	 the	 definition	 (May	 2005,	122-3,	 Robertson	 2012,	 513-4).	 The	 definition	 of	 the	 terms	 widespread	 or	systemic	 is	 found	 in	 Akayesu.	 A	 widespread	 attack	 is	 one	 that	 is	 “massive,	frequent,	 large	 scale	 action,	 carried	 out	 collectively	 with	 considerable	seriousness	 and	 directed	 against	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 victims.”2	 Systemic	 is	“thoroughly	 organised	 and	 following	 a	 regular	 pattern	 of	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	common	policy	involving	substantial	public	or	private	resources.”3	This	element,	therefore,	serves	to	link	what	would	otherwise	be	disparate	acts.	 	This,	 like	the	inclusion	of	state	or	organisational	policy,	implies	that	there	must	be	some	form	of	“organisational	responsibility”	 for	the	acts	 in	question	(Bassiouni	2003,	187-8).	 Given	 that	 Pogge’s	 thesis	 on	 global	 poverty	 is	 that	 the	 state	 system	 and	international	trade	agreements	are	responsible	for	global	poverty,	 it	 is	 likely	to	be	 considered	 widespread	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 state	 system	 is	 global	 and	systemic	insofar	as	the	global	trade	mechanisms	are	the	product	of	the	policy	of	certain	actors.		
2.3:	Mens	Rea	
The	final	element	goes	to	the	mental	state	(mens	rea)	of	the	person	who	commits	a	 crime	 against	 humanity.	 The	 Rome	 Statute	 requires	 that	 the	 agents	 have	knowledge	 that	 they	 are	 part	 of	 an	 attack.	 This	 is	 the	 biggest	 challenge	 to	 the	comparison	 with	 global	 poverty.	 When	 we	 think	 about	 those	 convicted	 for	crimes	against	humanity,	the	image	that	comes	to	mind	is	probably	someone	like	Duško	Tadić,	who	has	been	described	as	a	“freelance	torturer”	and	participated																																																									2	Akayesu,	¶580	3	Akayesu,	¶580	
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in	 the	 ethnic	 cleansing	 around	 Prijedor	 during	 the	 Yugoslav	Wars	 (Robertson	2012,	447).	Alternatively,	it	could	be	someone	like	Joseph	Kony,	the	leader	of	the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army,	who	directs	a	campaign	of	terror	around	Uganda-South	Sudan	 frontier.	These	are	men	who	deliberately	 inflict	 great	harm	on	 innocent	people.	This	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	for	someone	like	Roberto	Azevêdo,	the	current	 Director-General	 of	 the	 WTO.	 It	 would	 be	 extremely	 shocking	 if	 he	sought	to	harm	the	global	poor	in	a	way	comparable	to	Tadić	or	Kony.	However,	
mens	rea	is	more	complex	than	direct	malevolence.		Cherif	 M.	 Bassouni	 and	 Mark	 A.	 Drumbl	 have	 denoted	 three	 types	 of	people	 who	 commit	 crimes	 against	 humanity:	 policy	 makers,	 intermediate	agents,	 and	 low-level	 executors.	 The	 policy	 makers	 are	 the	 most	 important	because	they	are	the	moral	authors	of	the	crime.	These	are	the	agents	who	have	the	 power	 to	 commission	 the	 crime	without	 having	 a	 direct	 connection	 to	 the	material	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 (Bassiouni	 2011a,	 18,	 Drumbl	 2007,	 25).	Consequently,	 knowledge	 and	 intent	 are	 different	 than	 they	 would	 be	 for	someone	 conducting	mass	 killings.	 They	 are	 “held	 to	 an	 objective	 standard	 of	reasonableness	 and	 foreseeability	 without	 requiring	 the	 higher	 standard	 of	specific	 intent	 (or	dolus	 specialis)”	 (Bassiouni	2011a,	19).	Dolus	 specialis	would	characterise	someone	like	Tadić,	who	participates	in	murder	and	torture	rather	than	 someone	 who	 organises	 such	 acts,	 but	 might	 not	 directly	 participate	 in	them.	The	 relevant	 comparison	with	 the	 architects	 of	 global	 poverty	would	 be	the	standards	used	to	judge	policy	makers	rather	than	low-level	executors.		
In	order	for	someone	to	be	guilty	of	a	crime	against	humanity,	according	to	Article	7(1)	of	the	Rome	Statute,	they	must	have	knowledge	that	their	acts	are	
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part	 of	 a	widespread	 or	 systemic	 attack.	William	A.	 Schabas	 (2002,	 1018)	 has	described	 knowledge	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ICTY	 trials	 as	 “awareness	 that	circumstance	 exists	 or	 a	 consequence	 will	 be	 a	 likely	 outcome.”	 This	 is	complemented	by	the	requirement	of	intention	in	Articles	7.1.k	and	7.2.e-g	of	the	Rome	Statute,	at	 least	in	the	context	of	torture,	persecution,	extermination	and,	most	importantly	for	our	case,	“other	inhumane	acts”.	It	is	important	to	note	that	intent	 here	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 discriminatory	 insofar	 as	 it	 targets	 a	 specific	person	or	group.	There	does	not	need	to	be	detailed	knowledge	of	the	attack.	The	
Kunarac	Trial	Chamber	of	the	ICTY	stated	that	the	accused	must	either	intend	to	commit	 the	offence,	 that	his	acts	were	part	of	an	attack	on	civilians,	or	 that	he	“took	the	risk”	that	his	acts	would	be	part	of	such	an	attack	(Schabas	2002,	1024-5).4	 This	 seems	 to	 close	 the	 door	 to	 global	 poverty,	 since	 intentionality	 of	 this	sort	does	not	characterise	those	who	might	harm	the	global	poor.	The	drafters	of	TRIPS	sought	to	negotiate	trade	conditions	favourable	to	patent	holders,	such	as	pharmaceutical	companies,	in	their	states.	They	did	not	intend	to	immiserate	the	global	poor.	However,	 there	 are	 certain	 instances	 in	 international	 criminal	 law	where	 intention	 is	set	aside:	command	responsibility,	 joint	criminal	enterprise,	and	wilful	blindness	or	recklessness.		
Command	 responsibility	 emerged	 during	 the	 trials	 after	 the	 Second	World	War.	 It	was	 formalised	during	 the	 trial	of	General	Tomoyuki	Yamashita,	who	 commanded	 Japanese	 forces	 during	 the	 occupation	 of	 the	 Philippines.	During	 this	 time,	 soldiers	 under	 his	 command	 committed	 atrocities	 against	civilians	and	prisoners	of	war.	However,	Yamashita	himself	neither	ordered	nor																																																									4	Judgment,	Kunarac,	Kovac	and	Vukovic	(IT-96-23-T	&	IT-96-23/1-T),	Trial	Chamber,	22	February	2001,	¶434	
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participated	in	these	atrocities.	Nevertheless,	he	was	found	guilty	and	executed	on	the	grounds	that	he	made	no	attempt	to	discover	or	deter	these	widespread	abuses.	Bassouni	 (2011a,	163)	has	called	Yamashita’s	 conviction	a	 “blot	on	 the	history	of	American	justice”	that	resulted	in	the	execution	of	a	man	who	did	not	commission	atrocities	and	did	not	have	the	knowledge	to	stop	them.	Command	responsibility	formed	the	basis	for	the	ICTY	trials	of	Radovan	Karadžić	and	Ratko	Mladić	 (Robertson	 2012,	 523).	 It	 is	 also	 included	 in	 Article	 28	 of	 the	 Rome	Statute	 pertaining	 to	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 commanders	 and	 other	 superiors.	With	that	in	mind,	command	responsibility	has	limited	applicability	in	the	case	of	global	poverty,	as	command	responsibility	pertains	only	to	military	commanders	or	politicians	like	Karadžić,	who	was	the	President	of	the	Republika	Srpska	and	Supreme	Commander	of	its	armed	forces.	Trying	to	apply	it	outside	of	a	military	context	 would	 stretch	 a	 concept	 that	 is	 already	 controversial.	 However,	 what	command	responsibility	establishes	is	that	acts	in	international	criminal	law	can	cover	 omissions.	 It	 establishes	 that,	 if	 a	 person	 occupies	 a	 certain	 role,	 in	 this	case	a	military	officer,	 then	 they	have	certain	responsibilities	 for	 the	actions	of	others	and,	if	they	omit	to	properly	monitor	what	is	done	under	their	watch,	they	are	criminally	liable.		
The	 second	way	 in	which	 intention	 has	 been	mitigated	 in	 international	criminal	 law	 is	 through	 joint	 criminal	 enterprise.	 It	 is	 a	 form	 of	 liability	 that	emerged	from	the	ICTY.	In	Vasiljevic,	the	Appeals	Chamber	defined	three	types	of	joint	 criminal	 enterprise	 (Bassiouni	 2011a,	 560-563).	 In	 the	 basic	 type,	 all	 co-perpetrators	 possess	 the	 same	 criminal	 intent,	 as	 would	 be	 the	 case	 where	 a	group	carried	out	a	massacre	and	each	person	had	the	intent	to	kill.	The	second	
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category	 is	 the	 systemic	 form,	 which	 is	 “characterised	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 an	organised	 system	 of	 ill-treatment”,	 such	 as	 concentration	 or	 extermination	camps.5	 The	 final	 type	 is	 extended	 joint	 criminal	 enterprise	 “where	 one	 of	 the	perpetrators	 commits	 an	 act	 which,	 while	 outside	 the	 common	 purpose,	 is	nevertheless	 a	 natural	 and	 foreseeable	 consequence	 of	 the	 effecting	 of	 that	common	 purpose”.6	 The	mens	 rea	 for	 this	 final	 type	 requires	 the	 intention	 to	participate	 in	 the	common	plan,	but	also	adds	 responsibility	 for	outcomes	 that	weren’t	intended	but	were	foreseeable	and	in	which	the	agent	willingly	took	the	risk	that	such	crimes	could	occur.7		
In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ICTY,	 joint	 criminal	 enterprise	 replaced	 command	responsibility	as	the	main	theory	of	responsibility	in	prosecutions	as	it	applies	to	civilians	 and	 paramilitaries	 (Osiel	 2005,	 1786-7).8	 Although	 joint	 criminal	enterprise	is	most	closely	identified	with	the	ICTY,	it	is	arguably	included	in	the	Rome	Statute	under	 the	“common	purpose	doctrine”	 (Bassiouni	2011a,	573-4).	Joint	 criminal	 enterprise	 provides	 another	 means	 to	 sidestep	 the	 problem	 of	direct	 intent.	 Those	 who	 set	 up	 concentration	 camps	 or	 ethnically	 cleanse	 a	certain	 area	may	 not	 intend	mass	 killings	 to	 occur,	 but	 they	 are	 a	 foreseeable	consequence.	 This	 is	 relevant	 in	 the	 case	 of	 global	 poverty,	 since	 Pogge	repeatedly	 stresses	 that	 the	 poverty	 generated	 by	 the	 international	 system	 is	foreseeable	and	avoidable	even	if	it	is	not	the	aim	of	policy	makers.		
The	 final	 response	 to	 the	mens	 rea	 issue	 is	 to	 claim	 that	 recklessness	 is	sufficient.	The	idea	of	reckless	is	linked	with	charges	of	criminal	negligence.	It	is																																																									5	Judgment,	Vasiljevic	(IT-98-32-A),	Appeal	Chamber,	25	February	2004,	¶98	(Hereinafter	
Vasiljevic)	6	Vasiljevic,	¶99	7	Vasiljevic,	¶101	8	Vasiljevic,	¶100	
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distinct	 from	wilful	 blindness	 insofar	 as	 it	 does	 not	 require	 the	 agent	 to	 avoid	information	 that	 he	 or	 she	 suspects	 to	 be	 criminal.	 Instead,	 they	 will	 have	engaged	 in	 a	 course	 of	 action	 that	 has	 foreseeable	 harmful	 consequences.	 The	difficulty	 with	 making	 the	 case	 for	 recklessness	 is	 that	 this	 tends	 not	 to	 be	sufficient	for	crimes	against	humanity.	However,	there	is	reason	to	think	that	the	law	 is	 evolving	 towards	 accepting	 recklessness	 as	 being	 sufficient.	 This	would	allow	 the	mental	 state	 of	dolus	 eventualis	 to	 be	 equivalent	 to	dolus	 directus	 in	crimes	against	humanity,	where	 the	 former	 indicated	 the	awareness	of	a	 likely	outcome	 and	 the	 latter	 of	 a	 certain	 outcome.	 Diane	 Kearny	 has	 made	 the	argument	 that	 famine	 and	 food	 deprivations	 resulting	 in	 the	 violation	 of	socioeconomic	rights	can	be	prosecuted.	Unlike	Pogge,	her	focus	is	on	states	and	sub-state	 actors,	 but	her	 reasoning	 is	 helpful	 for	 the	 international	 context.	 She	notes	 that	 recklessness	 has	 featured	 in	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 in	 the	Extraordinary	 Chambers	 in	 the	 Courts	 in	 Cambodia	 (ECCC)	 and	 the	 ICTY	(Kearney	 2013,	 282-4).	 In	Duch,	 the	 ECCC,	which	 is	 responsible	 for	 trying	 the	crimes	 committed	 by	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge,	 ruled	 that	 the	 intention	 behind	 an	inhumane	 act	 was	 “likely	 to	 cause	 serious	 physical	 or	 mental	 suffering	 or	 a	serious	 attack	 on	 human	 dignity”.9	 The	 key	 word	 here	 is	 “likely”.	 It	 makes	 it	possible	 to	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 closer	 to	 the	 standard	 of	 “possible”	 rather	 than	“practically	 certain”	 (Kearney	 2013,	 269).	 This	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 ICTY	 Trial	Chamber’s	 judgment	 in	 Brđanin,	 which	 states	 the	 “accused’s	 act	 or	 omission	must	be	done	with	intention	or	recklessness	(dolus	eventualis)”.10	This,	Kearney	
																																																								
9 Judgment,	Kaing	Guek	Eav	alias	Duch	(001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC),	Trial	Chamber,	26	July	2010,	¶371 	10	Judgment,	Brđanin	(IT-99-36-T),	Trial	Chamber,	1	September	2004,	¶395	
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argues,	 gives	 the	dolus	eventualis	 credibility	as	 the	mens	 rea	 for	 crimes	against	humanity	(Kearney	2013,	284).		
The	mens	 rea	 component	 can	 be	 satisfied	 in	 the	 sense	 that,	 while	 the	primary	 aim	 of	 the	 international	 economic	 system	 is	 not	 to	 impoverish	 the	world’s	most	vulnerable	people,	 this	 is	a	 foreseeable	and	avoidable	outcome	of	the	 economic	 policies	 pursued	 by	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 and	affluent	 states	 (Pogge	 2008,	 36-7).	 Therefore,	 while	 the	 impoverishment	 of	millions	of	people	and	subsequent	poverty-related	deaths	may	not	have	been	the	direct	 aim	 of	 these	 organisations	 and	 agent,	 it	 is	 an	 anticipatable	 by-product.	This	 may	 differentiate	 it	 from	 different	 types	 of	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 but	does	not	seem	sufficient	to	set	it	aside.	Mao’s	Great	Leap	Forward,	for	example,	has	been	cited	as	a	crime	against	humanity.	It	 involved	the	mass	exportation	of	food	 to	pay	 for	 the	development	 of	 China’s	 industrial	 base,	 to	 the	point	 that	 it	produced	 a	 famine	 that	 killed	 upwards	 of	 45	million	 people	 between	 1958-62	(Makino	2001,	50,	Dikötter	2010,	324-34).	This	seems	to	be	an	instance	of	mass	killing	 as	 per	 the	 Rome	 Statute,	 but	 presumably	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 Chinese	government	 was	 not	 to	 kill	 these	 people.	 They	 were	 merely	 the	 predictable	collateral	 damage	 in	pursuit	 of	 a	misguided	plan	 for	 economic	development.	 If	Pogge	is	to	be	believed,	the	global	poor	have	been	the	grist	to	the	mill	of	a	more	successful	leap	forward.	Another	comparison	might	be	that	mass	extermination	is	comparable	 to	 first-degree	murder,	whereas	global	poverty	 is	comparable	 to	gross	 or	 criminal	 negligence	 causing	 death.	 These	 crimes	 carry	 different	sentences,	but	both	are	criminal	charges.	The	type	of	intentionality	at	play	with	global	 poverty	 is	 that	 of	 deliberately	 constructing	 an	 international	 system	 that	
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causes	 or	 perpetuates	 severe	 poverty,	 resulting	 in	 the	 unnecessary	 deaths	 of	millions	of	people.	This	sense	of	intentionality	is	not	alien	to	the	legal	conception	of	crimes	against	humanity.		
	
	 This	 section	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 intentionality	 in	 causing	 global	poverty	 does	 not	 undermine	 the	 comparison	 with	 crimes	 against	 humanity.	International	 criminal	 law	 has	 modes	 of	 responsibility	 such	 as	 joint	 criminal	enterprise	and	recklessness	that	can	be	applied.	However,	I	will	add	two	caveats	here.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 this	 only	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 the	 mental	element	is	present	in	the	causes	of	global	poverty.	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	 to	assess	whether	 those	 in	charge	of	 the	 institutions	 that	produce	global	poverty	 have	 acted	 with	 recklessness,	 for	 example.	 The	 second	 is	 that	 these	forms	 of	 liability	 are	 not	 without	 their	 detractors.	 Joint	 criminal	 enterprise	especially	has	attracted	criticism.	The	fear	is	that	it	casts	the	net	so	wide	for	guilt	and	 responsibility	 that	 it	 would	 undermine	 post-conflict	 reconciliation	 (Badar	2004,	Bassiouni	2011a,	574-5,	Drumbl	2007,	39-41,	Schabas	2002,	1033-5).	It	is	beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article	 to	 assess	 the	 arguments	 for	 and	 against	 these	modes	 of	 liability.	 It	 is	 sufficient	 to	 say	 that	 they	 are	 a	 part	 of	 international	criminal	law	and	provide	a	response	to	the	problem	of	intentionality.	
2.4.	Conclusion	
This	part	of	the	article	tested	whether	the	elements	of	crimes	against	humanity,	which	 act	 as	 necessary	 conditions	 for	 the	 comparison	 with	 global	 poverty,	provide	 reasons	 to	 dismiss	 Pogge’s	 claims.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that,	 as	 the	
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definition	of	an	attack	is	not	contingent	on	the	presence	of	war	or	armed	conflict,	the	 causes	of	world	poverty	 cannot	be	dismissed.	The	causes	of	world	poverty	also	cannot	be	described	as	 isolated,	but	rather	 form	part	of	a	widespread	and	systemic	policy	pursued	by	states	and	international	organisations.	The	victims	of	global	poverty	are	usually	not	part	of	the	armed	forces	or	the	police	and	can	be	counted	 as	 civilians.	 Finally,	 despite	 the	 apparent	 lack	 of	malicious	 intent,	 the	policies	 that	 cause	 global	 poverty	 cause	 grievous	 harm	 in	 a	 foreseeable	 and	avoidable	way.	This	satisfies	the	mens	rea	element.	This	is	not	enough	to	confirm	that	global	poverty	is	a	crime	against	humanity,	but	it	does	show	that	the	claim	is	not	as	implausible	as	it	first	appears.		
3.0:	Slavery,	Apartheid,	and	Global	Poverty	
The	Rome	Statute	lists	ten	acts	that	can	be	considered	crimes	against	humanity.	The	 mass	 immiseration	 of	 human	 beings	 is	 not	 among	 them.	 However,	 the	drafters	of	the	statute	recognised	that	crimes	against	humanity	are	an	evolving	concept	and	that	there	is	a	need	for	interpretive	flexibility	(Bassiouni	2011b,	56,	Kearney	 2013,	 272).	 Consequently,	 they	 included	 “other	 inhumane	 acts	 of	 a	similar	character	intentionally	causing	great	suffering,	or	serious	injury	to	body	or	to	mental	or	physical	health”	in	Article	7(1)(k).	This	opens	the	possibility	that	global	 poverty	 is	 comparable	 to	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity	 if	 it	 has	 sufficient	similarities	with	the	listed	acts.	The	focus	of	this	section	will	be	on	the	crimes	of	enslavement	 and	 apartheid,	 as	 they	 capture	 how	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 can	occur	at	an	interactional	level,	between	persons,	and	at	a	systemic	level,	between	persons	 and	 social	 institutions.	 They	 share	 a	 common	 element	 of	 extreme	
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domination	 that	 is	 also	 found	 in	 the	 causes	 of	 global	 poverty	 and	 this	 makes	Pogge’s	comparison	plausible.		
3.1:	Domination	
Domination	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 following	 terms:	 a	 social	 relationship	 or	institution	 is	 dominating	 if	 X,	 an	 agent,	 possesses	 the	 capacity	 to	 arbitrarily	interfere	 in	 the	choices	available	 to	Y,	a	dependent	agent	 (Blunt	2015,	5,	Pettit	2008,	 102-10,	 Skinner	 2008,	 84-5,	 Lovett	 2010,	 119,	 Pettit	 1997,	 52).	Domination	 has	 two	 different	 socially	 constituted	 modes:	 interactional	 and	systemic.	 The	 interactional	mode	 applies	 to	 relationships	 where	 an	 individual	has	 arbitrary	 power	 over	 another	 person.	 The	 systemic	 mode	 applies	 to	relationships	 and	 institutions	 in	 which	 the	 status	 of	 a	 person	 is	 arbitrarily	determined	and	 incontestable,	 though	 the	 individual	might	not	be	 subjected	 to	interactional	 domination	 (Blunt	 2015,	 12-19).	 Domination	 is	 considered	especially	abhorrent	because	it	dehumanises	the	subject	by	stripping	him	or	her	of	minimal	autonomy,	understood	as	the	ability	to	choose	and	pursue	their	own	conception	of	a	good	 life	(Pettit	1997,	90-2,	Lovett	2010,	130-1,	Laborde	2006,	369-70,	2010,	54-55).	Indeed,	in	extreme	cases	of	domination,	it	makes	one’s	life	or	death	dependent	on	the	whims	of	another	agent.	
3.2:	International	Domination,	Enslavement,	and	Global	Poverty	
The	crime	of	enslavement	is	defined	in	Article	7(2)(c)	of	the	Rome	Statute	as	“the	exercise	of	 any	or	 all	 of	 the	powers	 attaching	 to	 the	 right	of	 ownership	over	 a	person	 and	 includes	 the	 exercise	 of	 such	 power	 in	 the	 course	 of	 trafficking	 in	persons,	 in	 particular	 women	 and	 children.”	 This	 definition	 is	 not	 limited	 to	
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chattel	 slavery,	 but	 extends	 to	 informal	 relationships	 comparable	 to	 chattel	slavery	(Bassiouni	2011a,	378-81).	This	flexible	conception	of	slavery	means	that	a	 comparison	 with	 global	 poverty	 cannot	 be	 dismissed	 out	 of	 hand	 simply	because	the	global	poor	are	not	in	a	legal	relationship	of	enslavement.		
	 Slavery	 is	 often	 held	 up	 as	 the	 archetypical	 example	 of	 domination,	insofar	 as	 the	 slave-owner	 has	 a	 nearly	 unlimited	 capacity	 to	 interfere	 in	 the	choices	available	to	the	slave	(Pettit	1997,	31-5,	Lovett	2010,	154-6,	Lovett	and	Pettit	2009,	14,	Blunt	2015,	6-7).	The	person	who	 is	caught	 in	a	contemporary	form	of	slavery	is	in	a	similar	relationship	with	their	master	as	the	chattel	slave	is	 with	 his.	 The	 trafficked	 sex	 worker,	 for	 example,	 is	 liable	 to	 the	 arbitrary	interference	 of	 her	 pimp	 in	 nearly	 all	 aspects	 of	 her	 life	 and	 has	 no	 recourse	against	him.	It	may	not	be	recognised	as	legal,	but	this	is	irrelevant	so	long	as	the	elements	 of	 slavery,	 such	 as	 control	 of	 movement,	 psychological	 control,	 and	forced	labour	are	present	(Bassiouni	2011a,	379-80).	She	is	still	subjected	to	the	possibility	 of	 arbitrary	 interference	 in	 a	 way	 that	 undermines	 her	 minimal	autonomy	or	denies	her	self-ownership.	
	 People	living	in	extreme	poverty	are	often	those	caught	in	contemporary	slavery.	It	is	a	predictable	outcome	of	the	world’s	economic	system.	The	number	of	people	kept	 in	these	 forms	of	slavery	 is	not	 insignificant.	 It	 is	estimated	that	some	27	million	people	are	enslaved,	the	majority	of	which	are	found	in,	or	are	from,	 developing	 and	 least-developed	 countries	 (Bales	 2012,	 8-10).	 In	comparison,	the	total	number	of	people	trafficked	in	the	transatlantic	slave	trade	from	 the	 sixteenth	 to	 eighteenth	 centuries	 totalled	 11	million	 (Kara	 2009,	 4).	Slaves	have	become	an	attractive	commodity	to	many	industries.	This	is	due	to	a	
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collapse	 in	 the	 price	 of	 slaves	 as	 a	 result	 of	massive	 population	 growth	 in	 the	developing	world.	 Since	 the	 1950s,	 slaves	 have	 become	worth	 less	 than	 $100,	down	from	historical	highs	of	$40,000	(Bales,	Trodd,	and	Williamson	2009,	50-2).	These	low	acquisition	costs,	when	coupled	with	low	transport	costs,	can	lead	to	a	thousand-fold	return	on	investment	when	slaves	are	sold	 in	the	developed	world	(Kara	2009,	25).	Poverty	is	a	central	cause	of	human	trafficking.	It	acts	as	a	push	 factor	 for	 the	desperate.	This	 is	especially	 true	 for	women,	who	are	more	vulnerable	to	poverty	as	they	are	often	blocked	from	property	ownership,	credit,	and	inheritance	(Scarpa	2008,	13,	Bales	2012,	31-3).		
	 However,	while	we	may	accept	that	there	are	large	numbers	of	enslaved	people	 in	 the	world	 today,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	how	 this	 connects	with	 the	 causes	of	global	poverty.	Cecile	Laborde	(2010,	54)	has	argued	that	extreme	poverty	is	not	itself	dominating;	it	leaves	people	vulnerable	to	the	development	of	dominating	social	 relationships,	but	 international	organisations	and	powerful	 states	do	not	explicitly	 endorse	 these	 sorts	 of	 relationships	 (Bales	 2012,	 31-2).	 However,	Laborde’s	 claim,	 while	 correct,	 is	 isolated	 from	 the	 causes	 of	 global	 poverty.	International	 organisations	 create	 the	 conditions	 in	 which	 these	 relationships	are	 more	 likely	 to	 occur,	 and	 citizens	 of	 developed	 states	 benefit	 from	 these	slave-based	 relationships.	 If	 we	 look	 at	 Pogge’s	 critique	 of	 the	 resource	 and	borrowing	privileges,	we	can	see	that	they	undermine	the	capacity	of	developing	states	to	produce	minimally	just	and	stable	forms	of	government	that	can	protect	vulnerable	 people	 from	 relationships	 of	 slavery.	 As	 such,	 there	 is	 a	 causal	connection	 between	 the	 institutions	 that	 create	 global	 poverty	 and	contemporary	forms	of	slavery.		
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We	should	not	 limit	our	analysis	 to	 those	 living	 in	what	 is	 slavery	 in	all	but	name.	Domination	 can	be	used	 to	 frame	other	 social	 relationships	 that	 are	more	 directly	 connected	 with	 the	 global	 economy.	 Workers	 in	 sweatshop	factories,	 for	 example,	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 subjected	 to	 extreme	 domination.	They	 may	 not	 be	 formally	 or	 informally	 in	 bonded	 labour,	 but	 working	 in	dangerous	 conditions	 for	 minimal	 pay	 may	 be	 the	 only	 way	 they	 can	 make	 a	living.	 The	 corporations	 that	 run	 these	 factories	 possess	 arbitrary	 power.	 The	workers	are	in	circumstances	where,	if	they	complain	about	working	conditions	or	attempt	to	unionise,	they	may	be	fired	or	worse	(Pettit	1997,	140-3).	This	can	be	 connected	 to	 the	 two	 privileges	 undermining	 minimally	 just	 political	institutions;	it	can	also	be	connected	to	the	organisations	that	draft	the	rules	of	the	 global	 economy,	 which	 often	 require	 the	 government	 to	 minimise	 social	spending	and	deregulate	the	market	in	a	way	that	produces	brutal	conditions	for	industrial	labour.	As	such,	there	is	a	more	explicit	form	of	causal	responsibility.	This	is	further	supported	by	the	fact	that	people	in	the	developed	world	benefit	from	 the	 cheap	 goods	 that	 are	 produced	 in	 these	 circumstances	 (Bales	 2012,	235-40).	Again,	there	may	be	an	objection	that	this	is	morally	repugnant,	but	it	is	not	criminal.	However,	Robertson	(2012,	232-3)	asserts	that	many	multinational	corporations	 knowingly	 employ	 informal	 slave	 labour	 or	 wage-slaves	 in	 the	developing	world	 and	 asserts	 that	 this	 should	 produce	 some	 form	 of	 criminal	liability.	Yet,	even	if	this	were	not	the	case,	as	mentioned	previously,	the	fact	that	global	poverty	produces	relationships	of	extreme	domination	is	foreseeable	and	avoidable.	 This	 creates	 circumstances	 comparable	 to	 recklessness	 or	 wilful	blindness,	as	contemporary	slavery	or	slave-like	conditions	is	a	likely	outcome	of	our	shared	social	institutions.			
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Those	living	in	extreme	and	severe	poverty	are	in	circumstances	akin	to	slavery.	Their	poverty	makes	them	easy	targets	for	exploitation	in	relationships	that	 are	 structurally	 similar	 to	 slavery.	 The	 neo-liberal	 economics	 of	international	 institutions,	as	well	as	 the	dependence	on	access	 to	rich	markets,	has	 compelled	 developing	 states	 to	 deregulate	 their	 economies	 and	 remove	labour	 protections.	 This	 has	 placed	 many	 workers	 in	 circumstances	 akin	 to	slavery.	 This	 is	 not	 simply	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	 subjected	 to	 harsh	working	 conditions,	 but	 also	 because	 they	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 arbitrary	interference	by	 their	bosses	and	 foremen.	Wage-slavery	 is	 compatible	with	 the	broad	definition	of	 slavery	 found	 in	 the	Rome	Statute	and	can	be	 traced	 to	 the	imposition	of	unjust	terms	of	cooperation	at	the	global	level.		
3.3:	Systemic	Domination,	Apartheid,	Slavery,	and	Global	Poverty	
The	crime	of	apartheid	warrants	comparison	with	global	poverty	as	it	highlights	the	 structural	 side	 of	 crimes	 against	 humanity.	 It	 first	 appeared	 as	 a	 crime	against	 humanity	 in	 the	 International	 Convention	 on	 the	 Suppression	 and	Punishment	 of	 the	 Crime	 of	 Apartheid	 (Apartheid	 Convention).	 The	 crime	 of	apartheid	 was	 defined	 in	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 Apartheid	 Convention	 as	 “similar	policies	 and	 practices	 of	 racial	 segregation	 and	 discrimination	 as	 practised	 in	southern	 Africa.”	 This	 includes	 policies	 that	 prevent	 racial	 groups	 from	participating	 in	 political,	 social,	 economic,	 and	 cultural	 life,	 as	well	 as	 denying	basic	human	rights	and	freedoms.		Geras	(2011,	124-9)	has	used	this	to	suggest	that	 gender	 discrimination	 is	 comparable	 with	 apartheid,	 if	 one	 substitutes	gender	for	race.	The	argument	is	compelling	when	drawing	on	the	definition	of	apartheid	 found	 in	 the	Apartheid	Convention,	since	women	are	often	subjected	
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to	inferior	status	in	the	laws	of	many	countries.	However,	Article	7(2)(h)	of	the	Rome	 Statute	 is	more	 stringent,	 defining	 the	 crime	 of	 apartheid	 as	 “inhumane	acts	of	a	character	similar	to	those	referred	to	in	paragraph	1,	committed	in	the	context	of	an	institutionalized	regime	of	systematic	oppression	and	domination	by	one	racial	group	over	any	other	racial	group	or	groups	and	committed	with	the	 intention	of	maintaining	 that	regime.”	This	means	 that	a	system	in	which	a	racial	group	is	deprived	of	its	rights	has	not	committed	the	crime	of	apartheid;	it	must	be	supplemented	by	widespread	or	systemic	acts	such	as	murder	or	rape.	One	could,	for	example,	have	the	right	of	a	fair	trial	removed	by	a	regime	due	to	one’s	race,	but,	thanks	to	good	luck,	not	be	subjected	to	the	severe	deprivation	of	liberty	 or	 miscarriage	 of	 justice.	 This	 restricted	 definition	 of	 apartheid	 is	unfortunate	since	it	neglects	one	of	the	core	elements	of	what	makes	apartheid	detestable.	It	is	not	just	that	members	of	a	racial	group	are	subjected	to	acts	like	rape,	 torture,	 and	 murder,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 constantly	 subjected	 to	 the	possibility	of	these	acts.		
Apartheid	 is	 not	 only	 characterised	 by	 interactional	 domination,	 but	 by	systemic	domination	as	well.	In	the	former	case,	interactional	domination	occurs	in	 the	direct	 interaction	between	dominant	 and	 subservient	members	of	 racial	groups.	 The	 police	 officer	 that	 beats	 a	 member	 of	 the	 subjected	 group	 with	impunity	 is	 an	 example	 of	 this.	 However,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 conceptualise	 an	apartheid	regime	in	which	such	direct	 interactional	domination	does	not	occur.	Francis	 Lovett	 (2010,	 117-8)	 gives	 the	 example	 of	 a	 regime	 in	 which	 there	 is	racial	 discrimination,	 but	 the	 laws	 are	 publically	 known	 and	 impartially	enforced.	This,	he	claims,	is	not	an	instance	of	domination,	though	it	may	be	one	
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of	 unfairness,	 because	 the	 subjugated	 group	 is	 not	 vulnerable	 to	 arbitrary	interference	 and	 can	 confidently	 plan	 their	 lives.	 However,	 this	 neglects	 how	arbitrary	power	has	been	exercised	in	setting	the	terms	of	social	cooperation	in	the	 background.	 An	 apartheid	 system	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	 use	 of	 arbitrary	power	to	assign	a	group	of	persons	an	inferior	status	in	society.	This	status	may	be	 protected	 by	 law	 and	 impartially	 enforced,	 but	 it	 is	 still	 dominating.	 For	example,	 the	university	admissions	officer	 in	this	 idealised	apartheid	state	may	deny	 the	 application	 of	 a	 student	 from	 the	 “wrong”	 racial	 background	without	acting	arbitrarily;	he	or	she	is	following	the	letter	of	the	law	and,	if	they	violated	it,	 they	 would	 be	 reprimanded.	 However,	 the	 applicant	 is	 still	 dominated,	 as	there	 is	 no	 way	 for	 him	 to	 challenge	 the	 laws,	 which	 have	 arbitrarily	circumscribed	 the	 choices	 available	 to	 him.	 Consequently,	 apartheid	 is	 a	 crime	against	 humanity	 not	 only	 because	 it	 subjects	 certain	 people	 to	 interactional	domination	 by	 privileged	 racial	 groups,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 is	 characterised	 by	the	use	of	arbitrary	power	to	shape	the	terms	of	social	cooperation.	It	is	a	case	of	systemic	domination	(Blunt	2015,	12-18).		
This	 notion	 of	 apartheid	 as	 systemic	 domination	was	 recognised	 in	 the	Apartheid	Convention,	but	apparently	lost	in	the	Rome	Statute.	However,	it	does	remain	implicitly	intact	based	on	the	presence	of	the	crime	of	enslavement.	The	Rome	Statute	makes	apartheid	a	second	order	crime	against	humanity	in	that	it	requires	rape,	murder,	or	slavery	to	occur	within	the	context	of	racial	oppression	rather	than	racial	oppression	in	itself.	However,	the	inclusion	of	slavery	in	Article	7(1)(c),	 broadly	 defined,	 retrieves	 systemic	 domination	 since	 slavery	 has	interactional	elements	(the	master	beating	the	slave)	and	systemic	elements	(the	
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powers	of	 the	master	defined	by	 law	or	by	practice).	The	member	of	 the	racial	group	that	has	 its	status	arbitrarily	defined,	but	then	impartially	enforced,	 is	 in	circumstances	 comparable	 to	a	victim	of	 slavery.	This	 retrieval	of	 the	 systemic	domination	component	of	the	crime	of	apartheid	helps	to	open	the	comparison	with	the	causes	of	global	poverty.	
It	has	been	noted	how	the	 international	system	produces	circumstances	of	domination,	 such	as	contemporary	slavery	and	sweatshop	 labour.	This	dealt	largely	 with	 interactional	 domination,	 such	 as	 abuse	 by	 a	 pimp	 or	 employer.	Instead	 of	 retreading	 this	 ground,	 this	 section	 will	 focus	 more	 on	 systemic	domination.	 The	 way	 in	 which	 the	 asymmetric	 distribution	 of	 power	 in	 the	international	system	produces	unfair	terms	of	social	cooperation	has	been	noted	earlier	in	this	article.	These	factors	essentially	place	the	terms	of	global	economic	cooperation	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 world’s	 wealthiest	 states.	 This	 produces	circumstances	of	systemic	domination	that	are	comparable	with	apartheid.	This	is	not	to	claim	that	the	international	system	is	premised	on	racial	exclusion,	but	rather	 the	comparison	 is	 like	Geras’	 substitution	of	gender	 for	 race.	The	global	poor	are	excluded	from	setting	the	terms	of	international	social	cooperation	in	a	similar	way	that	black	and	coloured	citizens	were	in	South	Africa.	
However,	 there	may	be	objections	 to	 this	 comparison.	 In	 the	 first	place,	the	 apartheid	 regime	 was	 explicit	 in	 its	 exclusion	 of	 black	 South	 Africans,	whereas	 the	 international	 system	 is	 not.	 Indeed,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 “BRICS”	 states	indicates	 that	 power	 is	 migrating	 away	 from	 the	 developed	 states	 (Narlikar	2010).	However,	the	lack	of	formal	exclusion	does	not	do	much.	As	Pogge	notes,	the	delegations	of	poor	countries	to	the	WTO	have	been	effectively	excluded	by	a	
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lack	of	legal	expertise;	this	is	further	bolstered	by	the	fact	that	these	states	often	have	corrupt	oligarchic	governments	that	negotiate	on	behalf	of	the	ruling	elite	rather	than	the	common	citizen	(Pogge	2008,	28-9).	Additionally,	the	rise	of	the	BRICS	 states	 should	 not	 be	 overstated.	 The	 fact	 is	 that	 many	 of	 the	 world’s	poorest	persons	do	not	live	in	these	nascent	economic	powerhouses.	The	world’s	worst-off	persons	often	live	in	the	least	developed	countries.	It	is	naïve	to	think	that	 the	 BRICS	 speak	 on	 their	 behalf	 or	 even	 have	 complementary	 economic	interests.	In	this	sense,	the	shift	of	economic	power	away	from	Europe	and	North	America	does	not	mean	that	the	BRICS	states	are	looking	to	radically	reform	the	system	(Narlikar	2010,	Vickers	2013,	12,	Glosny	2010,	128-9).	Even	if	economic	power	 is	 reorienting,	 the	 billion	 worst-off	 persons	 are	 still	 subjected	 to	 an	international	 system	 that	 deeply	 affects	 their	 basic	 autonomy,	 but	 over	which	they	have	no	control.	This	is	comparable	to	apartheid.	
The	 use	 of	 arbitrary	 power	 to	 shape	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 global	 economic	system	can	be	compared	to	the	system	of	apartheid,	in	that	it	creates	a	system	of	exclusion	 that	 produces	 circumstances	 comparable	 to	 slavery,	 insofar	 as	 those	subjected	 to	 it	 have	 no	 control	 over	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 social	 institution.	Alternatively,	if	we	use	the	terms	of	the	Apartheid	Convention,	we	can	claim	it	is	a	 system	 that	 excludes	 people	 from	 the	 objects	 of	 their	 human	 rights.	Consequently,	 it	 can	be	 argued	 that	 global	 poverty	 is	 at	 least	 comparable	with	two	crimes	against	humanity:	the	crimes	of	enslavement	and	apartheid.		
4.0:	Responsibility	and	Resistance	
Despite	 the	 parallels	 between	 global	 poverty	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 it	seems	 fanciful	 to	 think	 that	many	people	 in	affluent	 countries	will	 support	 the	
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idea	 that	 they	are	complicit	with	 the	causes	of	global	poverty	 in	 the	same	way	that	 ordinary	 Germans	were	 complicit	 with	 the	 Holocaust,	 which	may	 explain	why	 cosmopolitanism	 gains	 little	 real	 political	 traction.	 This	 brings	 up	 an	interesting	aspect	of	the	phenomenology	of	crimes	against	humanity:	those	who	participate	in	them	sometimes	do	not	think	they	are	doing	anything	wrong.	The	mass	 atrocities	 that	 comprise	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 are	 often	 characterised	by	agents	who	participate	or	acquiesce	because	they	believe	that	the	victims	are	somehow	 less	 than	 human,	 or	 less	 worthy	 of	 humane	 treatment	 (Bassiouni	2011a,	 60-2).	 Daniel	 Goldhagen	 (1996,	 38)	 has	 argued	 that	 ordinary	 Germans	became	 willing	 participants	 in	 the	 Holocaust	 because	 eliminationist	 anti-Semitism	 became	 so	 pervasive	 that	 to	 question	 it	 would	 require	 them	 to	dismantle	 the	 foundations	 of	 their	 worldview.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 discount	 how	individuals	 can	 become	 desensitised	 to	 their	 complicity	with	 radical	 injustices	when	 their	 activities	 have	 been	 normalised.	 If	 individuals	 can	 believe	 that	murdering	 their	 neighbours	 based	 on	 their	 ethnicity	 or	 religion	 is	 morally	acceptable,	 then	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 similar	 circumstances	 can	 exist	 with	 how	people	view	their	attitudes	towards	the	global	poor.		
Jonathan	 Leader	 Maynard	 (2014,	 830-4)	 provides	 an	 account	 of	 the	justificatory	mechanisms	common	in	ideologies	that	lead	to	mass	atrocities	that	may	 be	 useful	 in	 explaining	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 global	 poor.	 The	 one	 that	seems	 especially	 relevant	 to	 the	 global	 poor	 is	 “deagentification”,	 where	perpetrators	do	not	see	their	actions	as	the	product	of	meaningful	agency;	that	the	 atrocity	 is	 the	 product	 of	 inevitable	 historical	 forces	 that	 one	 cannot	challenge.	 The	 examples	 given	 by	 Leader	 Maynard	 (2014,	 831-2)	 are	 Nazi	
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attitudes	towards	violent	racial	competition	as	a	law	of	nature,	and	the	Stalinist	belief	 that	 historical	materialism	 necessitates	 the	 liquidation	 of	 whole	 classes.	This	 has	 a	 parallel	 in	 the	 Churchillian	 critic’s	 view,	 in	 that	 the	 current	international	 economic	 system	 might	 be	 sub-optimal,	 but	 it	 is	 the	 best	 one	available	and	that	“the	poor	will	always	be	with	us.”	However,	if	Pogge	is	correct	and	global	poverty	is	the	foreseeable	and	avoidable,	then	this	is	a	grand	delusion.	This	leads	to	the	question:	what	is	to	be	done?	
The	crime	against	humanity	analogy	brings	into	focus	the	severity	of	the	wrong	 in	 a	 way	 that	 mere	 injustice	 does	 not.	 As	 Pogge	 (2008,	 11;	 2010,	 71)	mentions,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 unacceptable	 if	 Roosevelt’s	 reaction	 to	 Nazi	extermination	camps	was	a	pledge	to	reduce	the	number	of	people	in	the	camps	by	20%	over	 two	decades.	Yet,	many	cosmopolitan	solutions	 to	global	poverty,	Pogge’s	included,	are	at	best	distant	prospects.	Crimes	against	humanity	produce	a	 state	 of	 moral	 urgency	 and	 exceptionalism.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 how	 crimes	against	humanity	override	norms,	such	as	state	sovereignty,	sovereign	immunity,	and	 superior	 orders.	 There	 is	 a	 special	 odiousness	 about	 crimes	 against	humanity.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 sentiment	 that	 crimes	 against	 humanity	“outrage	the	conscience	of	humanity”,	though	what	the	cause	of	this	outrage	is	is	the	matter	of	some	debate.	This	is	true	even	if	in	practice	international	criminal	law	 is	 slow	 and	 imperfect.	 One	 only	 has	 to	 be	 reminded	 that	 Joseph	 Kony	remains	 at	 large,	 even	 though	 he	 was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 people	 indicted	 by	 the	International	 Criminal	 Court.	 This	 is	 a	 problem	 of	 the	 imperfect	 and	 evolving	nature	 of	 international	 criminal	 law	 rather	 than	 the	 concept	 of	 crimes	 against	humanity.			
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Cosmopolitans	 must	 reorient	 their	 guidance	 from	 a	 long-term	 ideal	theory	 to	 a	more	 immediate	 non-ideal	 theory.	 It	must	 not	 confine	 itself	 to	 the	systemic	 reforms,	 but	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 individuals	 might	 escape	 its	 worst	effects	 and	 speed	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 reforms	 that	 cosmopolitans	 advocate.	This	requires	that	the	scope	of	the	debate	be	broadened.	Typically,	the	literature	has	 focussed	 on	 the	 duties	 of	 affluent	 persons,	 but	 resistance	 asks	 what	 the	global	poor	are	permitted	to	do	in	reaction	to	ongoing,	intransigent,	and	radical	injustice.	This	will	help	to	reframe	the	global	poor	as	agents	in	this	debate	rather	than	victims	or	passive	recipients	of	duties	of	justice.		
This	 is	 not	 an	 easy	 adjustment,	 as	 resistance	 introduces	 the	 ethics	 of	political	 violence	 into	 the	 debate	 on	 global	 poverty.	 In	 a	 recent	 exchange	with	Kasper	 Lippert-Rasmussen,	 Pogge	 (2013,	 110)	 rejected	 the	 idea	 of	 violence,	specifically	“redistributive	wars”,	as	“macho”	and	unproductive.	I	share	some	of	Pogge’s	 concerns	 about	 redistributive	 wars,	 but	 his	 rejection	 of	 violent	resistance	 is	 unconvincing.	 His	 argument	 rests	 on	 three	 claims:	 that	 human	rights	 cannot	 be	 forfeited,	 that	 violence	 undermines	 the	 credibility	 of	 reform,	and	that	redistributive	wars	would	violate	the	principles	of	just	war	theory.	The	first	 is	 a	 reaction	 to	 Lippert-Rasmussen’s	 argument	 that	 the	 persons	 who	support	 unjust	 social	 institutions	 have	 lost	 their	 right	 to	 not	 be	 killed	 in	 a	redistributive	war	 (Lippert-Rasmussen	 2013,	 67-8).	 Pogge	 (2013,	 100)	 rejects	this	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 human	 rights	 are	 inalienable.	However,	 this	 does	 not	mean	that	there	are	no	circumstances	that	excuse	human	rights	violations.	The	doctrine	 of	 double	 effect,	 that	 excuses	 civilian	 causalities	 when	 they	 are	collateral	 damage	 from	 an	 attack	 on	 a	 legitimate	 target,	 is	 an	 example	 of	 this	
	 46	
(Walzer	 2006,	 152-9).	 Pogge	 must	 have	 this	 in	 mind	 when	 he	 condemns	 the	bombings	of	Dresden,	Hiroshima,	and	Nagasaki	for	killing	civilians	when	the	war	was	all	but	won	(Pogge	2013,	100-1).	The	problem	with	this	analogy	is	that	the	global	 poor	 are	 not	 in	 the	 position	 that	 the	 Allies	were	 in	 the	 last	 year	 of	 the	Second	 World	 War.	 The	 more	 accurate	 analogy,	 given	 Pogge’s	 claim	 that	 18	million	 people	 die	 per	 year	 from	 poverty-related	 causes,	 would	 be	 the	 British	Empire’s	 bombing	 campaign	 against	 Germany	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 war.	These	attacks	deliberately	terrorised	and	killed	civilians	but	have	been	justified	on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 British	 Empire	 was	 facing	 an	 existential	 threat	 or	“supreme	 emergency”	 that	 suspended	 the	 normal	 rules	 of	 war	 (Walzer	 2006,	251-63).	 Pogge’s	 claim	 that	 human	 rights	 are	 inalienable	 is	 plausible,	 but	 his	dismissal	of	instances	where	human	rights	can	be	excusably	violated	is	not.		
The	 second	 element	 is	 that	 redistributive	 wars	 would	 undermine	arguments	 for	reform.	They	would	compromise	the	“forum	where	 in	which	the	world’s	 poor	 have	 an	 unbeatable	 advantage:	 the	 forum	 of	 clear-headed	moral	debate	 and	 justification”	 (Pogge	2013,	 110).	 This	would	be	 compelling	 if	 there	was	 progress	 in	 reforming	 the	 systemic	 causes	 of	 global	 poverty;	 however,	 by	Pogge’s	own	argument,	 there	has	been	 little	movement	 to	 improve	 the	 lives	of	the	global	poor.	 It	seems	that	moral	debate	and	 justification	have	done	 little	 to	alleviate	their	suffering.	This	brings	about	the	problem	of	privilege	when	writing	about	global	poverty.	Debate	may	be	appealing	to	the	academic,	but	the	academic	does	 not	 suffer	 when	 those	 in	 power	 do	 not	 listen	 to	 their	 arguments.	 If	 one	debates	with	a	guard	at	Dachau	but	fails	to	convince	him	that	genocide	is	wrong,	it	 would	 seem	 rather	 bizarre	 to	 say	 that	 the	 prisoners	 should	 not	 resort	 to	
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violence.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 violence	 is	 justified	 in	 the	 case	 of	 global	poverty,	but	casts	doubt	at	the	ability	of	moral	debate	to	persuade	and	whether	it	is	 justifiable	 to	 condemn	 violence	 in	 circumstances	 of	 intransigent,	 radical	injustice.			
Finally,	Pogge	convincingly	argues	that	redistributive	wars	would	violate	the	 principles	 of	 just	 war	 theory	 by	 being	 unwinnable	 or	 unnecessary.	 They	would	be	unwinnable	 insofar	as	 the	 combined	military	might	of	 the	developed	world	would	doom	any	alliance	of	poor	states	to	defeat.	This	would	violate	the	principle	that	wars	are	only	just	when	there	is	a	reasonable	prospect	of	success	(Pogge	2013,	103-4).	Secondly,	if	there	were	an	alliance	of	reform-minded	states,	this	 would	 make	 the	 war	 unnecessary	 because	 there	 would	 be	 a	 reasonable	prospect	of	peaceful	reform.	The	war	would	violate	the	principle	of	last	resort	in	just	war	theory	(Pogge	2013,	104-5).	It’s	hard	to	disagree	with	this	assessment,	but	it	shows	that	just	war	theory	might	not	be	the	right	framework	for	looking	at	violent	 resistance	 and	 global	 poverty.	 In	 the	 first	 cases,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	redistributive	 war	 seems	 wildly	 implausible,	 since	 the	 international	 system	supports	 elites	 in	 developing	 states.	 If	 an	 alliance	 of	 reform-minded	 states	existed,	there	would	already	have	been	a	sea	change	in	the	international	system.	State-based	models	of	political	violence	do	not	capture	 the	reality	of	 the	global	poor.	 Cosmopolitans	would	 do	 better	 to	 examine	 such	 arguments	 through	 the	lens	of	non-state	actors	and	revolutionary	movements.		
Moreover,	 just	 war	 theory	 principles	 such	 as	 “reasonable	 chances	 of	success”	 do	 not	 match	 moral	 intuitions	 about	 resisting	 radical	 injustices.	 The	Warsaw	Ghetto	Uprising	 in	1943	had	no	chance	of	ending	 the	persecution	and	
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extermination	 of	 the	 Jews	 in	Nazi-occupied	Europe,	 but	 it	 is	 seen	 as	 a	morally	laudable	example	of	rejecting	the	passivity	of	victimhood.	Resistance	may	harm	innocent	people,	but	 that	does	not	necessarily	make	 it	 impermissible.	One	only	has	 to	consider	 the	many	slave	uprisings	 in	history,	 from	Spartacus	 through	 to	Nate	Turner	and	the	Haitian	Revolution,	in	which	innocent	people	died.	Finally,	resistance	might	 even	 take	 the	 form	 of	 terror.	Umkhonto	we	 Sizwe,	 the	 armed	wing	of	the	African	National	Congress,	employed	terrorism	and	sabotage	against	the	 apartheid	 government	 with	 limited	 success.	 Yet,	 few	 would	 say	 that	 the	imprisonment	of	Nelson	Mandela	and	many	others	was	a	just	response.	I	have	no	intention	of	putting	forward	a	“macho”	politics	that	endorses	violence.	My	point	is	that	the	ethics	of	political	violence	surrounding	extreme	injustices	like	crimes	against	humanity	and	genocide	are	 far	more	 complex	 than	Pogge	admits.	They	raise	 deeply	 uncomfortable	 questions,	 but	 these	 questions	 cannot	 be	 batted	aside.		
	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 second	 point,	 that	 violence	 and	 resistance	 are	 not	synonyms.	It	is	possible	that	the	most	effective	means	to	bring	about	the	reforms	Pogge	advocates	is	through	non-violent	resistance.	The	20th	century	had	notable	non-violent	 political	 movements	 led	 by	 people	 like	 Ghandi	 and	Martin	 Luther	King	 who	 achieved	 major	 reforms.	 There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 assume	 that	 non-violence	might	produce	 similar	 results	 for	 the	 global	 poor.	 Indeed,	 non-violent	resistance	to	global	poverty	may	provide	an	interesting	framework	by	which	to	assess	activities	such	as	illegal	migration	by	the	global	poor.	Illegal	migrants	may	break	 the	 law	 trying	 to	 enter	Europe	or	America,	 but	 they	might	 not	 be	doing	anything	 wrong	 if	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 developed	 world	 are	 complicit	 with	 the	
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causes	of	their	poverty.	It	provides	a	means	to	rebut,	for	example	David	Miller’s	mixed	 feelings	about	 illegal	 immigrants	 trying	 to	 reach	Europe	via	 the	Spanish	enclaves	 of	 Ceuta	 and	 Melilla.	 He	 admits	 sympathy	 for	 their	 poverty,	 but	indignation	 at	 their	 attempt	 to	 cross	 the	 border:	 “Do	 they	 think	 they	 have	 a	natural	 right	 to	enter	Spain	 in	defiance	of	 the	 laws	 that	apply	 to	everyone	else	who	might	like	to	move	there?”	(Miller	2007,	2-4).		They	may	not	have	a	“natural	right”,	 but	 our	wealth	 and	 their	 poverty	 are	 interconnected.	 Crossing	 a	 border	illegally	 is	a	wrong	 that	pales	 in	comparison	 to	 the	 immiseration	of	millions	of	other	 human	 beings.	 Illegal	 migration	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 resistance	 to	international	 rules	 that	 benefit	 the	 affluent	 by	 allowing	 the	 free	movement	 of	capital,	but	burden	the	poor	by	 limiting	the	free	movement	of	persons.	 It	could	be	that	cosmopolitans	might	have	a	duty	to	run	an	underground	railroad	to	those	suffering	in	extreme	poverty	if	their	governments	refuse	to	take	action	to	reform	the	 international	 system.	 This	 is	 merely	 a	 suggestion	 of	 how	 a	 theory	 of	resistance	could	develop	and	provide	guidance.	It	shows	that	we	should	not	limit	our	thinking	about	resistance	to	violent	state-centric	models	such	as	war	theory.		
	 I’m	afraid	 that	Pogge’s	belief,	 that	 the	 injustice	of	 global	poverty	 can	be	remedied	 through	 debate	 and	 long-term	 reform,	 is	 out	 of	 step	 with	 his	comparison	with	crimes	against	humanity.	What	the	analogy	makes	clear	is	that	cosmopolitans	 need	 to	 take	 non-ideal	 theory	 seriously.	 If	 the	 global	 poor	 are	being	 subjected	 to	 something	 comparable	 to	 slavery	 and	 apartheid,	 then	 the	guidance	provided	by	political	theory	needs	to	match	the	depths	of	this	injustice.	Questions	about	 the	ethics	of	 resistance,	especially	 regarding	political	violence,	cannot	 be	 set	 aside	 as	macho	 bravado.	 These	 questions	 need	 to	 be	 addressed	
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with	 the	 same	 rigor	 that	 has	 been	 brought	 to	 uncovering	 the	 causes	 of	 global	poverty,	even	if	it	leads	cosmopolitans	into	uncomfortable	territory.		
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